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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Prosecutorial discretion is a tremendous power.  In both the crim-
inal and the civil contexts, deciding to initiate enforcement actions is 
a considerable responsibility—one that should be exercised with care 
and consistency, but one that can be seriously abused.  Such discre-
tion is thus perhaps not a power that we should hastily confer on 
every member of society. 
This concept of prosecutorial discretion as an immense power, 
with considerable potential for abuse, offers a rationale for Article III 
standing doctrine that appears to have gone unnoticed in the aca-
demic literature.  Standing doctrine, in my view, curtails the prosecu-
torial discretion of private plaintiffs.  I arrive at this conclusion by 
comparing the broad Article III standing of the Executive Branch to 
the constraints placed on private parties.  I focus primarily on the fol-
lowing (apparent) anomaly:  although Congress may, consistent with 
Article III, authorize the Executive Branch to assert the abstract “in-
jury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed,”1 Congress may 
not confer similarly broad standing on private parties. 
It is important to recognize that the authority to “see that federal 
law is obeyed”2 gives the Executive Branch a considerable degree of 
discretionary enforcement authority.  The Executive Branch may 
bring suit against any person, anywhere in the country, for any legal 
 
 1 FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998). 
 2 See id. 
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violation.  But it is not feasible to pursue every transgression of fed-
eral law.  Accordingly, the Executive Branch must exercise prosecuto-
rial discretion to decide which of these innumerable offenses to pur-
sue in federal court. 
The Executive Branch cannot avoid this discretionary enforce-
ment responsibility.  The Take Care Clause of Article II, which pro-
vides that the Executive Branch “shall take care that the laws [are] 
faithfully executed,”3 requires it to “see that federal law is obeyed.”  
The Take Care Clause therefore also requires it to exercise the con-
siderable degree of prosecutorial discretion that is necessary to fulfill 
that law enforcement function.  Moreover, the Executive Branch has 
a constitutional duty to exercise that obligation faithfully, with due 
regard for congressional mandates and constitutional constraints. 
But the degree of discretionary enforcement authority exercised 
by the Executive Branch also creates a troubling potential for abuse.  
Such discretion can be used to discriminate against, or otherwise un-
fairly target, certain individuals or groups.  For this reason, I assert 
that the Executive Branch’s duties to “see that federal law is obeyed,” 
and to exercise the accompanying prosecutorial discretion, are non-
delegable.  Given the potential for abuse, Article II prohibits Con-
gress and the Executive Branch from delegating such discretionary 
enforcement authority to private parties, who are not subject to con-
stitutional requirements or to the other legal and political checks 
that, to some degree, curtail executive enforcement discretion. 
This Article II nondelegation doctrine provides a constitutional 
explanation for much of Article III standing doctrine.  Standing en-
forces this Article II nondelegation principle by curtailing private 
prosecutorial discretion.  Standing doctrine prohibits a private plain-
tiff from asserting abstract grievances, such as the “injury to the inter-
est in seeing that the law is obeyed,” that would allow her to sue any 
person, anywhere in the country, for any violation of law.  A private 
party may bring suit only if she has suffered a more concrete “injury-
in-fact.”  That injury, in turn, further limits the scope of her prosecu-
torial discretion, because she may sue only the person that caused her 
injury and may seek redress only for that harm. 
Viewing standing in these Article II nondelegation terms has sur-
prising implications for existing theories of standing doctrine.  Cur-
rently, most scholars and jurists who consider the foundations of 
standing doctrine fall into one of two camps.  Several prominent 
 
 3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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judges, including Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Antonin 
Scalia, contend that the Constitution requires that a plaintiff have a 
concrete injury in every case, and that Congress may not confer 
standing on a broader class of citizens.4  Conversely, most legal aca-
demics assert that standing doctrine lacks any constitutional founda-
tion, and that Congress may confer standing as it sees fit.5  But, inter-
estingly, both sides do appear to agree on one thing:  whatever its 
rationale, a central feature of standing doctrine is that it blocks pri-
vate suits that might interfere with executive enforcement efforts.6 
The Article II nondelegation doctrine offers an alternative ac-
count.  I argue that standing doctrine does have a constitutional 
foundation:  it enforces the Article II nondelegation principle by cur-
tailing private prosecutorial discretion.  And, under this constitu-
tional analysis, standing doctrine’s principal function is not to protect 
the Executive Branch.  Instead, standing doctrine protects individual 
liberty by shielding private parties from arbitrary exercises of private 
prosecutorial discretion. 
 
 4 See John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1219–21, 
1226, 1231–32 (1993); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the 
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881–82, 894–99 (1983). 
 5 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation:  Notes on 
the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 54 (1984) (suggesting that courts should 
not “hold[] unconstitutional an act of Congress” conferring standing on private plain-
tiffs); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication:  The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 
1363, 1371, 1397 (1973) (stating that “at least when Congress so authorizes the Court may 
properly render . . . pronouncements [about the meaning of the Constitution] whether 
or not recognizable private interests are involved”); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, 
Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L. J. 1141, 1154–60 (1993) (arguing that the 
injury-in-fact inquiry should not be used to limit Congress’s power to confer standing); 
Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?  Of Citizen Suits, ‘Injuries,’ and Article III, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 163, 235 (1992) (asserting that “Congress can create standing as it chooses 
and, in general, can deny standing when it likes”); see also William A. Fletcher, The Struc-
ture of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223–24 (1988) (making the more nuanced claim that 
Congress should have “essentially unlimited power to define the class of persons entitled 
to enforce [a statutory] duty,” while Congress should have only “some, but not unlimited, 
power to grant standing to enforce constitutional rights”); infra note 7. 
 6 See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege:  The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. 
REV. 301, 334 (2002) (“The Court has enlisted the injury concept to provide a bulwark 
against intrusions on executive power, a task that the concept simply cannot carry out.”); 
Roberts, supra note 4, at 1230 (asserting that the injury-in-fact requirement “ensures that 
the court is carrying out its function of deciding a case or controversy, rather than fulfill-
ing the executive’s responsibility of taking care that the laws be faithfully executed”); Sun-
stein, supra note 5, at 194–95 (observing that many “key cases” in which the Court denied 
standing “have involved attempts by some plaintiff to require the executive branch to ful-
fill its statutory responsibilities by enforcing the law more vigorously”); see also infra notes 
15–22 and accompanying text. 
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This constitutional foundation for standing doctrine changes not 
only the focus but also the scope of the constitutional protection.  
Understood in Article II nondelegation terms, standing doctrine ap-
plies (as a constitutional mandate) only in cases that implicate private 
liberty.  Such cases include all suits against private parties and all suits 
against the Executive Branch in which the real party-in-interest is a 
private individual or entity (i.e., suits demanding that the Executive 
Branch impose burdens on, or deny benefits to, specific private par-
ties).  But this Article II nondelegation theory leaves Congress other-
wise free to authorize private suits against the federal government.  
The Article II nondelegation doctrine thus offers a constitutional jus-
tification for much of Article III standing doctrine, while also preserv-
ing some space for legislative action. 
In Part II, I briefly contrast the theory presented here with prior 
Article II theories of standing.  In Part III, I discuss the Executive 
Branch’s broad Article III standing.  I explain that the Executive 
Branch’s Article II duty to “see that federal law is obeyed” requires it 
to exercise substantial prosecutorial discretion.  In Part IV, I show 
that standing doctrine prevents private parties from exercising the 
same degree of prosecutorial discretion, and explain that this limita-
tion can be seen in Article II nondelegation terms. 
II.  A NEW ARTICLE II THEORY OF STANDING 
Standing doctrine has sustained great criticism in the academic 
commentary.7  The three-part test that comprises the doctrine is easily 
summarized, but much less easily explained.  The Supreme Court has 
stated that standing derives from the “case” or “controversy” re-
 
 7 See e.g., Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 381 
(1989) (arguing that “modern standing doctrine lacks a coherent conceptual founda-
tion”); Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending—The Role of Legal and Equitable Principles, 
4 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001) (urging that “the American doctrine of standing is in a sad 
state of disrepair”); Fletcher, supra note 5, at 221 (“The root of the problem is . . . that the 
intellectual structure of standing law is ill-matched to the task it is asked to perform.”); 
Nichol, supra note 6, at 304 (claiming that “as a body of law, the standing doctrine has 
failed”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers:  A Neo-Federalist Ap-
proach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 480 (1996) (arguing that standing doctrine is “theoreti-
cally incoherent”); Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 129 
(2007) (asserting that current justiciability doctrines, including standing, “serve little or 
no useful purpose”); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing:  
Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 639–40 (1999) (arguing that the injury-in-fact 
test is incoherent); supra notes 5–6 and infra note 27.  For rare defenses of standing doc-
trine, see infra note 105. 
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quirement of Article III.8  In order to satisfy this “bedrock” require-
ment and bring suit in federal court, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
that she has suffered (or is likely to suffer) an “injury-in-fact” that was 
(or will be) caused by the defendant and that can be redressed by the 
plaintiff’s requested relief.9 
I am principally concerned with the following puzzle of standing 
doctrine:  the dichotomy between Executive Branch and private party 
standing.  The Supreme Court has held that Article III prohibits pri-
vate suits asserting abstract grievances, such as the “injury to the in-
terest in seeing that the law is obeyed.”10  But, as several commenta-
tors have observed, this constitutional limitation does not apply to the 
Executive Branch.11  Instead, the Court has repeatedly found that the 
Executive Branch may file suit to “see that federal law is obeyed,” at 
least if it has the blessing of Congress.12  How can it be that Congress 
 
 8 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 225 (2003).  The case-or-controversy requirement is 
found in U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 9 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 225–26; Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990). 
 10 FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23–24 (1998) (stating that a plaintiff may not assert a “general-
ized grievance” “where the harm at issue is not only widely shared, but is also of an ab-
stract and indefinite nature,” such as “harm to the ‘common concern for obedience to 
law’” or the “injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed” (quoting L. Singer & 
Sons v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 311 U.S. 295, 303 (1940)); see Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 
437, 442 (2007) (“The only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law . . . has not been fol-
lowed.  This injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance . . . that 
we have refused to countenance in the past.”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 573–74 (1992) (“[A] plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about gov-
ernment—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of 
the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits 
him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.”). 
 11 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—And Their Connec-
tions to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 667 (2006) (“Congress . . . possesses un-
doubted power to authorize enforcement actions by the government.  In suits by the gov-
ernment, courts characteristically make no inquiry into injury.”); Edward A. Hartnett, The 
Standing of the United States:  How Criminal Prosecutions Show That Standing Doctrine Is Looking 
for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239, 2245 (1999) (observing that, 
when the federal government initiates a federal criminal prosecution, it asserts “an ‘ab-
stract . . . injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed’” (quoting Akins, 524 U.S. 
at 24)); Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L. 
REV. 589, 627 (2005) (“Federal courts regularly adjudicate government enforcement ac-
tions that would lack ‘injury in fact’ if brought by private plaintiffs.”); Jonathan R. Siegel, 
Congress’s Power to Authorize Suits Against States, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 44, 67–68 (1999) 
(“The courts do not require the government, as they would a private party, to demon-
strate that it has suffered an injury in fact.”). 
 12 See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 27 (1960) (concluding that it is “perfectly 
competent for Congress to authorize the [Attorney General] to be the guardian of [the] 
public interest” in the “due observance of all the constitutional guarantees”); L. Singer & 
Sons, 311 U.S. at 303–04 (“[A] suit [to enforce a statute] cannot be instituted by an indi-
vidual unless he possesses something more than a common concern for obedience to law.  
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may confer broad standing upon the Executive Branch, but not upon 
a private attorney general?13 
This anomaly may suggest that standing doctrine depends, at least 
in part, on Article II.14  Commentators have, however, generally as-
sumed that any Article II theory of standing must take the following 
form15:  Article II vests the President with “the executive power,”16 and 
further states that he “shall take care that the laws [are] faithfully ex-
ecuted.”17  These provisions, the argument goes, give the Executive 
Branch a general power over law enforcement and private suits to 
“see that the law is obeyed” interfere with the Executive Branch’s en-
 
The general or common interest finds protection in the permission to sue granted to 
public authorities.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 586 
(1895) (“[W]henever the wrongs complained of are such as affect the public at 
large . . . the mere fact that the government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy 
is not sufficient to exclude it from the courts . . . .”); United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 
128 U.S. 315, 367 (1888) (“The essence of the right of the United States to interfere in 
the present case is its obligation to protect the public . . . .”); see also Newman v. United 
States ex rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537, 547 (1915) (“[E]very citizen and every taxpayer is in-
terested in the enforcement of law . . . . But that general interest is not a private but a 
public interest.  Being such, it is to be represented by the Attorney General or the District 
Attorney . . . .”). 
 13 The Supreme Court recently indicated that state governments are subject to less restric-
tive standing requirements than private parties.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 
518 (2007).  This Article focuses on the contrast between Executive Branch and private 
party standing and does not address the distinct issue of state standing. 
 14 See Hartnett, supra note 11, at 2256 (asserting that, given the differences between Execu-
tive Branch and private party standing, the question of “‘Who can constitutionally be em-
powered to represent . . . public interests in court?’” must be “a question of the proper in-
terpretation, not of Article III or Article I, but of Article II”).  The scholarly interest in 
Article II also stems from references to the Take Care Clause in a few central standing 
decisions.  See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (“To permit Congress to convert the undifferenti-
ated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual 
right’ vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the 
courts the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 
737, 756–57, 761 (1984) (“The Constitution . . . assigns to the Executive Branch, and not 
to the Judicial Branch, the duty to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”). 
 15 This Article II theory appears to underlie Chief Justice Roberts’s and Justice Scalia’s ap-
proach to standing doctrine.  See Roberts, supra note 4, at 1230 (asserting that the injury-
in-fact requirement “ensures that the court is carrying out its function of deciding a case 
or controversy, rather than fulfilling the executive’s responsibility of taking care that the 
laws be faithfully executed”); Scalia, supra note 4, at 894 (arguing that standing “excludes 
[courts] from the . . . undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two branches 
should function”). 
 16 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America.”). 
 17 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted . . . .”). 
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forcement prerogative.18  Private parties may, for example, bring suits 
that the Executive Branch has explicitly decided to forgo, and there-
by interfere with its overall enforcement strategy.  Even more intru-
sively, a private party might bring suit directly against the Executive 
Branch to force it to change its overall enforcement policies or to 
urge it to bring an enforcement action against a third party.  In sum, 
according to this argument, private actions are problematic under 
Article II because they interfere with the Executive Branch’s en-
forcement discretion.19 
There are several flaws in this approach, most of which have been 
noted before.  Most importantly, as Gene Nichol and Cass Sunstein 
have pointed out, the above analysis cannot possibly explain standing 
doctrine.20  This analysis provides no principled means of distinguish-
ing between suits in which the plaintiff can show an injury-in-fact, and 
those in which she cannot.  Although it is true that a private suit to 
“see that the law is obeyed” may interfere with the Executive Branch’s 
enforcement strategy, so might any other private enforcement ac-
tion.21  A party with an injury-in-fact is free to bring an enforcement 
action that the Executive Branch has declined to bring, and some-
times even to bring suit directly against the Executive Branch.  Ac-
cordingly, the injury-in-fact requirement of standing doctrine does 
 
 18 See David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing:  The Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context for 
Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808, 874 (2004) (“The Article II theory begins 
with the premise that the Executive’s power to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted’ limits other parties’ capacity to sue.”); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Note, State 
Courts, Citizen Suits, and the Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law by Non-Article III Plain-
tiffs, 110 YALE L.J. 1003, 1028 (2001) (characterizing this theory to mean that “[w]ere 
Congress positioned to empower ‘any citizen’ to enforce its laws, Congress could usurp a 
central element of the executive’s Article II prerogatives”); Sunstein, supra note 5, at 211 
(interpreting Lujan and other cases to assert that “standing limitations . . . protect against 
intrusions on the President’s power under the Take Care Clause”). 
 19 See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, What if Justice Scalia Took History and the Rule of Law Seriously?, 12 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 155, 158 (2001) (asserting that the typical Article II-based the-
ory “invokes the separation of powers concern . . . that the Executive Branch must be al-
lowed its prosecutorial discretion”). 
 20 See Nichol, supra note 5, at 1164–65; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 211–14. 
 21 Thus, as a few commentators have observed, this Article II-based theory, taken to its logi-
cal conclusion, would require the invalidation of much existing law.  See William W. Buz-
bee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 247, 283 (2001) 
(stating that the logical conclusion of this theory would be that “citizens can never en-
force statutory law”); Driesen, supra note 18, at 875 (similarly noting that “[a]n exclusive 
executive enforcement power would . . . . require disallowance of all private, state, tribal, 
and territorial actions litigating federal public law questions, including actions brought by 
seriously injured parties”). 
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not protect the Executive Branch from private interference with its 
so-called enforcement prerogative. 
This failure to explain standing doctrine reflects, in my view, er-
rors in the conceptual underpinnings of this Article II-based theory.  
First, it conceives of the Executive Branch’s law enforcement function 
as a power, rather than as a duty.  This conception leads commenta-
tors to focus excessively on ways in which private enforcement actions 
interfere with the Executive Branch’s enforcement power.  And that 
leads to the second major problem with prior reliance on Article II.  
It focuses on the wrong entity.  The focus should not be on the Ex-
ecutive Branch, but on the private plaintiff—the party to whom stand-
ing doctrine actually applies.22 
I seek here to offer a constitutional analysis that avoids these con-
ceptual problems.23  I believe, as Professor Sunstein and others have 
 
 22 The focus on executive enforcement power has led some commentators to suggest that 
standing doctrine applies only when a private party brings suit against the Executive 
Branch.  See Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 1793, 1793 n.5 (1993) (asserting that suits against private parties “do[] not 
rise to the level of a constitutional concern”); Winter, supra note 19, at 159.  The Court 
has, however, applied standing requirements in suits against private parties as well as state 
and local governments.  See infra note 96.   
   Harold Krent and Ethan Shenkman have offered perhaps the most cogent Article II 
analysis to date.  Relying on the theory of the “unitary executive,” Krent and Shenkman 
assert that Article II prevents private parties that lack an “individuated” interest (an inter-
est that appears to be analogous to an Article III injury-in-fact) from bringing enforce-
ment actions in federal court.  See Krent & Shenkman, supra, at 1794–96.  The authors ar-
gue that the principle of political accountability underlying the notion of the unitary 
executive requires that the President be in charge of law enforcement efforts involving 
the “unindividuated” interests of the public at large.  Id. at 1794–96, 1804–08.  Krent and 
Shenkman offer many persuasive policy arguments as to why the President should be in 
charge of certain law enforcement activities.  But they do not clearly explain why there is 
any constitutional distinction between cases involving individuated and unindividuated in-
terests.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Correspondence, Article II Revisionism, 92 MICH. L. REV. 131, 
137 (1993) (stating, in response to the Krent & Shenkman article, that “[t]he unanswered 
question remains why [the] distinction [between individuated and unindividuated inter-
ests] is crucial for purposes of Article II”).  Furthermore, Krent and Shenkman suggest 
that their constitutional analysis is limited to suits against the Executive Branch.  See Krent 
& Shenkman, supra, at 1793 n.5. 
 23 For purposes of this constitutional analysis, I bracket questions about the historical foun-
dations of standing doctrine.  For historical arguments that standing must not be a consti-
tutional requirement, because courts at the Founding did not require private parties to 
demonstrate an injury-in-fact, see Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions:  Is It a 
Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 819–27 (1969); Steven L. Winter, The Meta-
phor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1396–99 (1988).  
For a contrary position, see Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the English Prerogative Writs:  
The Original Understanding, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1001 (1997); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb 
Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 691, 694–724 (2004) 
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asserted, that the Take Care Clause creates a “duty, not a license.”24  
Indeed, that formulation is more in keeping with the text of the pro-
vision, which states that the Executive Branch “shall take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed.”25  Furthermore, my focus is not on how a 
private enforcement action might interfere with the Executive 
Branch’s so-called enforcement power, but rather on how much en-
forcement power may be exercised by a private plaintiff. 
This conceptual approach makes possible a more coherent under-
standing of standing doctrine.  The Take Care Clause imposes on the 
Executive Branch a duty to take appropriate measures, including fil-
ing suit in federal court, to “see that federal law is obeyed.”  The Take 
Care Clause thus also (as discussed in Part III) imposes a corollary re-
sponsibility.  It requires the Executive Branch to exercise the substan-
tial degree of prosecutorial discretion that is necessary to fulfill that 
law enforcement obligation.26 
I argue here that these Article II duties are nondelegable.  As 
commentators critical of executive enforcement discretion have ar-
gued (and as discussed in Part IV), such discretion creates a troubling 
potential for abuse, even when it is exercised by a governmental en-
tity that is subject to constitutional and other legal and political con-
straints.  Given this potential for abuse, the Constitution prohibits 
Congress and the Executive Branch from delegating such prosecuto-
rial discretion to private parties, who are subject to no such require-
ments. 
This Article II nondelegation principle offers a new rationale for 
Article III standing doctrine.  Standing enforces the Article II non-
delegation doctrine by curtailing private prosecutorial discretion.  
Standing doctrine prohibits a private plaintiff from asserting an ab-
stract grievance (such as the “injury to the interest in seeing that the 
law is obeyed”) that would allow her to sue any person for any legal 
violation.  Furthermore, standing doctrine permits a court to identify 
 
(asserting, based on their comprehensive survey of early American law, that “history does 
not defeat standing doctrine” (emphasis omitted)). 
 24 Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 
670 (1985);  see Caminker, supra note 7, at 377 (“[T]he take care clause is better under-
stood as a directive that the President must execute the law consistently with Congress’ 
will, rather than as a grant of exogenously defined power . . . .”). 
 25 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added). 
 26 The term “prosecutorial discretion,” as used here, refers to the authority to decide 
whether to pursue a violation of law by bringing an enforcement action in federal court.  
The term applies to enforcement actions (including civil suits) brought by both the Ex-
ecutive Branch and private parties. 
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private enforcement actions that do not implicate the Executive 
Branch’s nondelegable Article II responsibilities.  When a private par-
ty has suffered an injury-in-fact, she cannot exercise substantial pro-
secutorial discretion.  She may sue only the person that caused her 
injury and may seek redress only for that harm. 
This Article II nondelegation concept of standing rests on norma-
tive premises that differ markedly from prior Article II theories.  Un-
der the Article II nondelegation principle, standing doctrine serves 
not to protect the Executive Branch, but instead to safeguard individ-
ual liberty against arbitrary exercises of private prosecutorial discre-
tion.  The constitutional protection therefore applies only in cases 
that implicate private liberty:  all suits against private defendants and 
all suits against the Executive Branch in which the real party-in-
interest is a private individual or entity.  That latter category consists 
of (1) suits demanding that the Executive Branch impose burdens on 
particular private parties (by, for example, bringing an enforcement 
action against them); and (2) suits seeking to prevent the Executive 
Branch from conferring a benefit (such as a license, permit, or finan-
cial grant) on a specific private party.  To bring any such action, a 
private plaintiff must demonstrate a concrete injury-in-fact. 
This Article II nondelegation theory does not, of course, rational-
ize every facet of standing doctrine.  The concept of standing as a lim-
it on private prosecutorial discretion helps to explain and justify the 
prohibition on abstract grievances—the part of the injury-in-fact re-
quirement that the Court has identified as constitutionally mandated.  
But I do not purport to defend every standing decision.  It is indeed 
difficult, as many commentators have observed, to understand why 
the Court has recognized certain injuries-in-fact and not others, and 
why the Court has adopted a narrow view of causation and redress-
ability in some cases and not others.27 
 
 27 See supra notes 5–7.  The Court itself has acknowledged that standing doctrine has flaws.  
See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 
U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (“We need not mince words when we say that the concept of ‘Art. III 
standing’ has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases de-
cided by this Court . . . .”).  For just a few of the insightful critiques of the Court’s stand-
ing jurisprudence, see Fallon, supra note 5, at 22–30, 43–47 (contending that, once a 
plaintiff has demonstrated an injury-in-fact, the Court should not substantially restrict the 
remedies that she may pursue to redress that injury); Fletcher, supra note 5, at 229–39 
(asserting that the Court should abandon the “injury-in-fact” inquiry altogether and focus 
on whether the relevant statutory or constitutional provision confers a legal right on the 
plaintiff); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting 
Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276, 2280–88 (1998) (asserting that neither precedent nor 
any identifiable theory explains the manner in which the Court has defined an injury-in-
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The Article II nondelegation principle does, however, help ex-
plain why—and when—a private plaintiff must assert a concrete in-
jury that guides her prosecutorial discretion.  This theory thus also 
carves out some space for congressional conferrals of standing.  Al-
though Congress may never permit a private party to bring suit against 
any person, anywhere in the country, for any violation of law, Con-
gress does have some leeway to authorize any person to sue the Ex-
ecutive Branch.28 
III.  THE ARTICLE III STANDING OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
In this Part, I examine the nature of and the basis for the Execu-
tive Branch’s broad Article III standing.29  This analysis reveals that 
the Executive Branch’s duty to “see that federal law is obeyed” re-
quires it to exercise a substantial degree of prosecutorial discretion. 
A.  Standing to Enforce Federal Law 
By the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court made it clear 
that the Executive Branch had standing to assert injuries that would 
not suffice for a private plaintiff.  For example, in United States v. 
American Bell Telephone Co.,30 an 1888 case involving a land patent, the 
Court observed that a private party (at that time) could challenge the 
validity of such a patent only if she had a “pecuniary interest” in the 
matter.31  By contrast, the Executive Branch was not so constrained:  
“the right of the United States to interfere” in the action arose from 
its “obligation to protect the public.”32 
 
fact in the racial gerrymandering context); Nichol, supra note 5, at 1154–60 (arguing that 
the Court’s injury-in-fact inquiry is malleable and essentially value-laden); Sunstein, supra 
note 5, at 183–92 (asserting that the proper inquiry is whether the relevant provision cre-
ates a cause of action for the plaintiff); Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing:  A Plea 
for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 680–84 (1977) (asserting that the Court’s stand-
ing inquiry often amounts to a determination on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim). 
 28 For purposes of this analysis, I bracket questions of Congress’s power to confer standing 
in suits against the States.  Such cases could raise federalism concerns that are beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 29 I focus on Congress’s authority to confer standing on the Executive Branch, not on 
whether the Executive Branch has inherent power to file suit absent congressional au-
thorization.  For insightful discussions of the latter issue, see Henry P. Monaghan, The 
Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1993); Larry W. Yackle, A Worthy 
Champion for Fourteenth Amendment Rights:  The United States in Parens Patriae, 92 NW. U. L. 
REV. 111 (1997). 
 30 128 U.S. 315 (1888). 
 31 See id. at 366–67. 
 32 Id. 
  
Apr. 2009] NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE 793 
 
Likewise, in In re Debs,33 the Court stated that the federal govern-
ment’s “obligation[] . . . to promote the interest of all” and to “pre-
vent . . . injury to the general welfare” can often be “sufficient to give 
[the United States] a standing in court.”34  Accordingly, the Court 
upheld the Executive Branch’s standing to protect the public interest 
in the free flow of interstate commerce.35  Federal courts followed suit 
in subsequent cases, raising no Article III concerns about law en-
forcement actions brought by the Executive Branch.36 
United States v. Raines37 constitutes perhaps the most explicit state-
ment of Congress’s authority to confer standing on the Executive 
Branch.  In Raines, the federal government brought suit against local 
officials in Georgia, alleging that they had improperly interfered with 
voter registration efforts by African Americans.38  The Civil Rights Act 
of 1957 expressly permitted such suits.39  The local officials, however, 
argued that Congress lacked the power to “authorize the United 
States to bring this action in support of private constitutional 
rights.”40 
The Supreme Court rejected that contention, stating that “there is 
the highest public interest in the due observance of all the constitu-
tional guarantees, including those that bear the most directly on pri-
vate rights.”41  The Court found that it was “perfectly competent” for 
 
 33 158 U.S. 564 (1895). 
 34 Id. at 584. 
 35 See id. at 599. 
 36 See supra notes 11–12.  Courts have doubted the Executive Branch’s standing to bring suit 
only when it lacked express congressional approval.  See, e.g., United States v. City of Phila-
delphia, 644 F.2d 187, 201 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that “the United States may not sue [a 
local police department] to enjoin violations of individuals’ fourteenth amendment 
rights without specific statutory authority”); United States v. Mattson, 600 F.2d 1295, 1297 
(9th Cir. 1979) (concluding that, absent statutory authorization, the Executive Branch 
may not sue a state to protect the constitutional rights of the mentally retarded confined 
in state hospitals); United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d 1121, 1123–24 (4th Cir. 1977) 
(same).  But the courts’ analyses also indicated that, once Congress authorized the law-
suits, there would be no Article III barrier.  See City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d at 201 & n.22; 
Mattson, 600 F.2d at 1297 (stating that the Executive Branch could “easily” establish stand-
ing if it had “specific statutory authority”); Solomon, 563 F.2d at 1125, 1128 (declining to 
hold that the Executive Branch could sue “in the absence of specific authority,” even 
though the court had “no doubt that the United States has an interest . . . in the subject 
matter of the suit”). 
 37 362 U.S. 17 (1960). 
 38 Id. at 19. 
 39 Id. at 19–20; see also Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 637 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a), 
(c) (2000)). 
 40 Raines, 362 U.S. at 27. 
 41 Id. 
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Congress to authorize the Executive Branch “to be the guardian of 
that public interest.”42 
Notably, the Raines Court did not conclude that the Executive 
Branch had standing to assert the private parties’ concrete interest in 
the right to vote.43  Instead, the Court found that the Executive 
Branch was authorized to serve as the “guardian” of the abstract “pub-
lic interest” in the “due observance of all the constitutional guaran-
tees.”44  Few formulations come closer to stating that Congress may, 
consistent with Article III, authorize the Executive Branch to see that 
the law is obeyed. 
B.  The Constitutional Foundation for the Executive Branch’s Standing 
The Supreme Court has not sought to explain the constitutional 
basis for the Executive Branch’s broad Article III standing, but the 
answer seems fairly self-evident.  The Court does not interpret Article 
III in a vacuum, but instead construes Article III in conjunction with 
the Take Care Clause of Article II. 
The Take Care Clause states that the President “shall take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed.”45  The provision thereby seems 
to direct the President to take appropriate measures to “see that fed-
eral law is obeyed.”  And, as the Supreme Court has observed, “[a] 
lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law.”46  Thus, the 
Constitution appears to direct the President, in appropriate cases, to 
file suit in federal court to enforce federal law. 
Of course, we have long understood that this duty to “take Care 
that the Laws [are] faithfully executed” does not require the Presi-
dent to personally initiate federal court enforcement actions.47  In-
stead, the President exercises his law enforcement responsibilities 
 
 42 Id. 
 43 Nor could the Executive Branch assert such private interests under the Court’s traditional 
standing jurisprudence.  To have third-party standing, a litigant must demonstrate an in-
jury-in-fact, a close relationship with the third party whose rights are at issue, and that the 
third party is unable to protect her own interests.  Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 
(1991).  The Executive Branch could not satisfy that first requirement, absent special 
standing rules. 
 44 Raines, 362 U.S. at 27. 
 45 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 46 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976). 
 47 See id. at 135 (“‘[T]he President alone and unaided could not execute the laws.  He must 
execute them by the assistance of subordinates.’” (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 
U.S. 52, 117 (1926))); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63–64 (1890) (stating that the President 
may fulfill his constitutional obligation to ensure that the laws are “faithfully executed” by 
delegating to, inter alia, executive departments). 
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through public officials in the Executive Branch.48  Accordingly, I re-
fer to the duty to “take care that the laws [are] faithfully executed” as 
an obligation of the Executive Branch. 
The Executive Branch could not perform this constitutionally as-
signed duty if it lacked the authority to bring suit in federal court to 
see that federal law was obeyed.  The federal courts accordingly con-
strue such an executive enforcement action as a justiciable Article III 
case or controversy.  Indeed, an interpretation that prevented the 
Executive Branch from performing this constitutional duty would 
contravene longstanding separation of powers principles.49 
We should keep in mind, however, that this contextual analysis—
interpreting Article III in light of Article II—has different implica-
tions for private enforcement actions.  In contrast to the Executive 
Branch, a private party has no Article II duty to “see that federal law is 
obeyed.”  Accordingly, the constitutional structure does not suggest 
that such a private suit must qualify as an Article III “case” or “contro-
versy.”  Instead, as discussed in Part IV, a contextual reading of Arti-
cles II and III indicates precisely the opposite. 
 
 48 As used here, the term “Executive Branch” encompasses both independent and executive 
agencies.  (A federal agency is typically considered “independent” if the President lacks 
the authority to remove the agency’s leaders “at will.”  See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional-
ism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 492 (1987)).  Although in some contexts it 
may be appropriate to distinguish these two types of agencies, no such distinctions need 
be made here.  The Department of Justice (an executive agency) supervises virtually all 
litigation by the United States and represents both independent and executive agencies 
in federal court.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519 (2006) (authorizing the Attorney General to 
represent the interests of the United States in court); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies 
in Government:  Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 587 
(1984) (“The Department of Justice, to varying degrees, represents [the] interests [of 
both types of agencies] in court . . . .”).  Accordingly, as other commentators have ob-
served, independent and executive agencies are largely indistinguishable, at least insofar 
as they bring suit to see that federal law is obeyed.  See, e.g., Michael Herz, United States v. 
United States:  When Can the Federal Government Sue Itself?, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893, 954 
(1991) (“[A]t least in regard to litigation, viewing independent agencies as different from 
executive agencies is a mistake.”). 
 49 See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 701 (1997) (“‘[T]he separation-of-powers doctrine re-
quires that a branch not impair another in the performance of its constitutional duties.’” 
(quoting Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996))); see also Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 383 (1989) (stating that the “separation-of-powers inquiry” often “fo-
cus[es] ‘on the extent to which [a provision of law] prevents the Executive Branch from 
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions’” (quoting Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. 
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)) (second alteration in original)). 
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C.  The Executive Branch’s Prosecutorial Discretion 
The Executive Branch’s Article II duty to “see that federal law is 
obeyed” encompasses a corollary responsibility.  To fulfill that law en-
forcement function, the Executive Branch must exercise a consider-
able degree of prosecutorial discretion.  This realization has signifi-
cant implications for private enforcement actions.  The Executive 
Branch’s prosecutorial discretion provides a window into the degree 
of prosecutorial power that a private plaintiff would have, if she too 
could pursue the “injury to the interest in seeing that the law is ob-
eyed.”  Indeed, private parties would have even greater prosecutorial 
discretion, because they are not subject to the legal and political 
checks that, to some degree, constrain executive enforcement offi-
cials.  As discussed in Part IV, these distinctions seem to explain why 
our legal system accords a greater degree of discretionary enforce-
ment authority to the Executive Branch.50 
1.  The Breadth of the Executive Branch’s Prosecutorial Discretion 
As many commentators have observed, the Executive Branch al-
ways exercises some discretion in interpreting and applying the law.51  
Statutory and regulatory provisions supply only general guidelines for 
conduct.  The Executive Branch must apply those general proscrip-
tions to specific scenarios.52  Moreover, there are countless transgres-
sions of federal law, and the Executive Branch lacks the time and the 
financial resources to pursue each one,53 even if it wished to.54  Ac-
 
 50 In discussing prosecutorial discretion, I draw upon analyses from both the criminal and 
the civil enforcement contexts, which raise analogous concerns.  See Marshall v. Jerrico, 
Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980) (“Our legal system has traditionally accorded wide discre-
tion to criminal prosecutors in the enforcement process, and similar considerations have 
been found applicable to administrative prosecutors . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also 
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (recognizing that “an agency’s refusal to in-
stitute [civil enforcement] proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the 
decision of a [criminal] prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict”). 
 51 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 373 (2002) 
(“Very few rules are entirely opaque; most leave some room for interpretation and discre-
tion in application.”). 
 52 See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 725 
(1997) (“Every statute confers some degree of discretion on those who implement it. No 
legislator, however prescient, can predict all the twists and turns that lie ahead for his or 
her handiwork.”). 
 53 See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement:  The Case for Ex-
panding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 107 (2005) (“The budget and 
manpower of federal regulatory agencies are generally quite limited, and many agencies 
simply lack the capacity to enforce the law adequately.”). 
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cordingly, the Executive Branch must pick and choose among these 
innumerable violations and determine which to pursue in federal 
court. 
I am most interested in the breadth of the Executive Branch’s 
prosecutorial discretion.  The Executive Branch’s authority to “see 
that federal law is obeyed” allows it to pursue any transgression of 
federal law.  Accordingly, the Executive Branch has the discretion to 
bring suit against any person, anywhere in the country, for any viola-
tion.  The authority of a particular agency is only somewhat more lim-
ited.  An agency may bring suit against any person, anywhere in the 
country, for any violation of a particular subset of federal law.  In ei-
ther case, that is an extraordinary discretionary power. 
For the Executive Branch, it is also an extraordinary responsibility.  
As discussed below, the Executive Branch is not (at least in principle) 
free to exercise its enforcement discretion as it pleases.  But that dis-
cussion should not distract us from this point:  a considerable degree 
of prosecutorial discretion inevitably accompanies the authority to 
see that the law is obeyed. 
2.  Legal and Political Constraints on Executive Enforcement Discretion 
The academic commentary on executive enforcement discretion 
suggests that there is much agreement on how the Executive Branch 
should exercise its prosecutorial discretion (although there is much 
disagreement over the extent to which it adheres to that ideal).  I 
draw upon this literature and relevant doctrine to identify certain es-
sential elements of that normative standard:  faithful interpretation, 
uniformity, and nondiscrimination.  I also note various ways in which 
our legal system can hold the Executive Branch accountable when it 
fails to comply with that standard.  Notably, I offer this account, not 
to suggest that the Executive Branch always (or even typically) abides 
by that normative standard, but instead to underscore (as discussed 
in Part IV) that private parties have no similar obligations and are 
subject to no such constraints. 
 
 54 Various commentators have observed that full enforcement of the law might be unwise, 
even if it were feasible, because it could discourage lawful and socially beneficial conduct.  
See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1749 n.14 
(2005) (observing that overenforcement “is detrimental to society . . . when it chills so-
cially beneficial conduct”); Deborah Platt Majoras, Recognizing the Significance of Prosecuto-
rial Discretion in a Multi-Layered Antitrust Enforcement World, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 121, 
123–24 (2002) (noting that overenforcement may cause parties to “avoid[] legitimate be-
havior”). 
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First, the Executive Branch should, in accordance with the very 
text of the Take Care Clause, interpret and apply the law faithfully.  
Thus, the Executive Branch should not construe a legal provision 
narrowly, so as to render it essentially meaningless.  Nor should the 
Executive Branch refuse to enforce a provision of law55 simply be-
cause the current presidential administration disagrees with its un-
derlying policies.56 
The Executive Branch should also apply the law uniformly,57 estab-
lishing national enforcement policies and priorities to guide its en-
forcement officials in exercising prosecutorial discretion.58  And, crit-
ically, these policies and priorities must be “nondiscriminatory.”  As 
used here, that term means that the Executive Branch may not use its 
prosecutorial discretion to favor or disfavor certain individuals or 
groups.  Thus, the Executive Branch should not pursue individuals 
for nefarious reasons, such as personal animosity,59 or because of 
their race or ideology.60  Nor should administrative officials decline to 
 
 55 See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 
104 YALE L.J. 541, 583–84 (1994) (stating that the Take Care Clause “mak[es] clear that 
the President has no royal prerogative to suspend statutes”); Sunstein, supra note 24, at 
670 (“[T]he ‘take Care’ clause does not authorize the executive to fail to enforce those 
laws of which it disapproves.”).  Justice Scalia has, however, expressed a contrary view.  See 
Scalia, supra note 4, at 897 (arguing that executive officials should not enforce laws that 
have outlived their usefulness). 
 56 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2347 (2001) 
(noting the “risk that a presidential administration might displace the preferences of a 
prior . . . Congress by interpreting statutes inconsistently with their drafters’ objectives”).  
One exception may be when the Executive Branch considers a statute to be unconstitu-
tional.  Because the Constitution is the supreme law that the Executive Branch is charged 
with faithfully executing, it should perhaps decline to enforce seemingly unconstitutional 
provisions.  See Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. 
REV. 389, 397 (1987) (noting this possibility, but arguing that the President should en-
force the law even in this context). 
 57 See Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General:  The Federal Government’s Chief Lawyer and Chief Liti-
gator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1068 (1978) (asserting that the Ex-
ecutive Branch should adopt a “coherent, consistent interpretation of the law, to the ex-
tent that it is administratively possible to do so”). 
 58 See, e.g., Richard M. Thomas, Prosecutorial Discretion and Agency Self-Regulation:  CNI v. 
Young and the Aflatoxin Dance, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 152 (1992) (asserting that agencies 
should adopt enforcement guidelines). 
 59 See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5 
(1940) (stating that “the most dangerous power of the prosecutor” is “that he will pick 
people that he thinks he should get, rather than pick cases that need to be prosecuted”). 
 60 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (stating that the Executive Branch 
may not bring an enforcement action to punish an individual for “exer-
cis[ing] . . . protected statutory and constitutional rights”); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 
356, 373–74 (1886) (holding that administrative officials violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment when they discriminated on the basis of race in applying a local ordinance); 
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bring enforcement actions against regulated parties that have sought 
to “capture” the relevant agency.61  Instead, the Executive Branch 
should apply the law in an evenhanded and consistent manner. 
Recent history has, however, cast doubt on the Executive Branch’s 
willingness or capacity to enforce the law in accordance with this 
nondiscrimination principle.  According to media reports, the Justice 
Department under Attorney General Alberto Gonzales was politically 
biased in exercising its prosecutorial discretion.62  Several U.S. Attor-
neys claimed that they were discharged, either because they brought 
criminal prosecutions against President George W. Bush’s political 
supporters or because they failed to prosecute his political oppo-
nents.  This “U.S. Attorney Scandal,” along with other complaints of 
improper management and low morale at the Justice Department, 
stirred congressional investigations into its enforcement policies and 
practices.63  The mounting criticism ultimately led Gonzales to resign 
from his post as Attorney General.64 
What can we take away from these events?  This recent history cer-
tainly illustrates the extent to which the Executive Branch’s prosecu-
torial discretion is subject to abuse (a topic discussed further in Part 
IV).65  But I think we can take away a more positive message as well.  
The U.S. Attorney Scandal was a “scandal” because we demand more 
from our federal enforcement officials.  We expect them to enforce 
the law in a fair and evenhanded manner.  We expect them to prose-
cute individuals for their conduct and not for their political beliefs.66  
 
see also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249 (1980) (“In appropriate circumstances 
the Court has made clear that traditions of prosecutorial discretion do not immunize 
from judicial scrutiny cases in which the enforcement decisions of an administrator were 
motivated by improper factors or were otherwise contrary to law.”). 
 61 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1667, 1713 (1975) (“It has become widely accepted . . . that the comparative over-
representation of regulated or client interests in the process of agency decision results in 
a persistent policy bias in favor of these interests.” (footnotes omitted)).  Some commen-
tators, however, have voiced doubts about the validity of agency “capture” theory.  See, e.g., 
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
1511, 1566 (1992) (asserting that commentators may “overstate the susceptibility of agen-
cies to capture”). 
 62 See Dan Eggen, Ex-Attorney General Says Politics Drove Federal Prosecution, WASH. POST, Oct. 
24, 2007, at A3. 
 63 For a thoughtful discussion of these events, see Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The 
U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and the Allocation of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (2008). 
 64 See Dan Eggen & Michael A. Fletcher, Embattled Gonzales Resigns:  Attorney General Was Criti-
cized for Terrorism Policy, Prosecutor Firings, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2007, at A1. 
 65 See infra notes 172–75 and accompanying text. 
 66 Cf. Lara Jakes Jordan, Mukasey Sworn in as Attorney General, ASSOC. PRESS, Nov. 9, 2007 (ob-
serving that the newly appointed Attorney General Michael Mukasey “made clear to sena-
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Most importantly, when the Executive Branch fails to properly per-
form this duty, we have mechanisms to hold it accountable.  We can 
even force a recalcitrant Attorney General to resign. 
Indeed, our legal system has crafted various methods to hold ex-
ecutive enforcement officials accountable for the discretionary deci-
sions that they make in “seeing that federal law is obeyed.”  First, ex-
ecutive enforcement decisions are subject to a limited form of judicial 
review.  Federal courts may examine whether the Executive Branch 
has violated the Constitution by selectively targeting persons of a par-
ticular ethnicity or ideology.67  The courts can also review executive 
enforcement decisions that are out of step with a clear statutory 
mandate.68 
Executive enforcement decisions are also subject to congressional 
oversight.  Congress may amend a statute to clarify the Executive 
Branch’s duties, establishing enforcement priorities69 or prescribing 
the remedies that the Executive Branch is permitted to seek for vari-
ous statutory violations.70  Congress may also use its appropriations 
power71 or hold congressional hearings to exert control over an agen-
cy’s enforcement practices (as illustrated by the U.S. Attorney Scan-
dal).72 
Furthermore, the Executive Branch can itself take measures to ca-
bin the prosecutorial discretion of individual enforcement officials.  
It can, for example, provide its employees with manuals that set forth 
 
tors” during his confirmation hearings that he would not “tolerate politics influencing 
decisions about prosecuting cases or hiring career attorneys”). 
 67 See supra note 60. 
 68 An agency’s decision not to take a particular enforcement action is “presumptively unre-
viewable.”  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).  But this presumption “may be 
rebutted” when a congressional statute “has provided guidelines for the agency to follow 
in exercising its enforcement powers.”  See id. at 832–33.  Furthermore, federal courts can 
review enforcement decisions that are based on (allegedly incorrect) statutory interpreta-
tions, such as an agency’s conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction to exercise its enforcement 
authority.  See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25 (1998). 
 69 See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833. 
 70 For example, in the civil regulatory context, Congress sometimes establishes parameters 
for the assessment of civil monetary penalties.  See 29 U.S.C. § 666(a)–(d) (2006); 12 
U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(A)–(C) (2006). 
 71 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 394, 418 (1982) (“Congress . . . may use the appropriations process . . . to ensure 
that [an] agency does not overenforce a statute, or to indicate that cer-
tain . . . illegalities . . . are the intended object of the statutory standard.”). 
 72 See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Dis-
cretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 791 (1999) (“Oversight hearings . . . give legislators in the 
relevant committees the chance to impose costs if enforcers are insufficiently attentive to 
their concerns.”). 
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its enforcement policies,73 and then conduct internal reviews74 or take 
other measures to prevent officials from bringing suits that are out of 
step with those policies.75 
I identify these compliance mechanisms to highlight (as discussed 
in Part IV) that no such constraints apply to private prosecutorial dis-
cretion.  But I do not want to overstate the effectiveness of any of 
these forms of review.  Judicial review is often an inadequate means 
of curtailing executive enforcement discretion.  Federal courts rarely 
review individual nonenforcement decisions,76 and selective prosecu-
tion claims are extremely difficult to prove.77  Moreover, Congress 
may not have the time, the staff, or the political will to hold oversight 
hearings every time it disagrees with an executive enforcement policy, 
much less an individual enforcement decision.78  Congress may be 
 
 73 See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 843 
(2004) (“Prosecutors’ offices, especially those that deal with a large volume of similar cas-
es, often adopt policies in order to promote consistency and administrative efficiency.”).  
This method of restraint does, however, rely on the Executive Branch’s willingness and 
capacity to constrain individual enforcement officials.  The publication of such guidelines 
does not give rise to any individual rights and, accordingly, defendants cannot rely on 
those guidelines to challenge individual enforcement decisions in court.  See In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he guidelines 
provide no enforceable rights to any individuals, but merely guide the discretion of the 
prosecutors.”); United States v. Paternostro, 966 F.2d 907, 912 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 74 See Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines:  A Case Study in 
Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 960 n.303 (2000) (observing that the Ex-
ecutive Office of U.S. Attorneys conducts reviews every few years to ensure that field of-
fices “comply[] with Department policies and procedures”). 
 75 Notably, the federal government has a centralized system for determining which cases 
should be appealed to the courts of appeals and ultimately to the Supreme Court.  See 
United States Department of Justice, Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/aboutosg/function.html (noting that the Solicitor General’s 
Office “review[s] all cases decided adversely to the government in the lower courts to de-
termine whether they should be appealed and, if so, what position should be taken”).  
The Solicitor General can use this authority over the appellate process to ensure, to some 
degree, consistency in government enforcement efforts.  For example, on two occasions, 
the Solicitor General successfully moved in the Supreme Court to dismiss criminal prose-
cutions that were out of step with the federal government’s overall enforcement policies.  
See Redmond v. United States, 384 U.S. 264, 264–65 (1966); Petite v. United States, 361 
U.S. 529, 530–31 (1960). 
 76 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (holding that an agency’s decision not to 
take a particular enforcement action is “presumptively unreviewable”). 
 77 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1996) (stating that enforcement 
decisions are entitled to a “presumption of regularity” and that, in order to “dispel [that] 
presumption,” a person must provide “clear evidence” that the decision was improperly 
motivated). 
 78 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium:  A Delegation Doctrine for the 
Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1424 (2000) (“Traditionally, Congress has used 
[oversight] hearings sparingly and for matters of some prominence.”). 
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even less inclined to correct executive enforcement decisions by sta-
tutory amendment, given the cumbersome nature of the legislative 
process (and the possibility of presidential veto).79  The Executive 
Branch is likewise subject to budgetary and time constraints that may 
hinder its ability to oversee individual enforcement officials (assum-
ing, of course, that it has the political will to conduct such oversight 
at all). 
Ultimately, no amount of central executive supervision, congres-
sional oversight, or federal court review will fully cabin prosecutorial 
discretion—not when officials are charged with the abstract duty to 
ensure that “the law is obeyed.”  Thus, in the end, we must recog-
nize—as former Attorney General (and Supreme Court Justice) Ro-
bert Jackson put it—that we grant our public officials this discretion-
ary enforcement authority, not because we are confident that they 
will always exercise it perfectly, but “because it seems necessary that 
such a power to prosecute be lodged somewhere.”80  And the Consti-
tution, via the Take Care Clause of Article II, has indicated where we 
should “lodge” the power to see that the law is obeyed.  The Constitu-
tion has designated the Executive Branch as “the guardian of that 
public interest.”81 
IV.  THE ARTICLE III STANDING OF PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS 
It has been well-established for over a century that the Executive 
Branch has standing to bring suit in federal court to “see that federal 
law is obeyed.”  It is equally well-established that private plaintiffs may 
not assert such an abstract grievance.  As described below, this restric-
tion prevents private plaintiffs from exercising the same degree of 
prosecutorial discretion as the Executive Branch. 
This concept of standing as a limit on private prosecutorial discre-
tion provides both a principled explanation and a policy rationale for 
much of standing doctrine.  This analysis also suggests a constitu-
tional and normative justification for standing doctrine that has 
largely been overlooked by commentators:  standing doctrine pro-
 
 79 See Kagan, supra note 56, at 2259 (“[A]ll the claims of legislative control [over administra-
tive action] inadequately acknowledge the limits on Congress’s ability to impose harsh 
sanctions. Statutory (including most budgetary) punishments require the action of the 
full Congress—action which is costly and difficult to accomplish.”). 
 80 Jackson, supra note 59, at 3. 
 81 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 27 (1960). 
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tects individual liberty against arbitrary exercises of private prosecu-
torial discretion. 
A.  Private Parties Must Allege “Something More” Than the “Common 
Concern for Obedience to Law” 
Fairchild v. Hughes82 provides an early illustration of the Supreme 
Court’s unwillingness to hear abstract private grievances.  In Fairchild, 
the plaintiff challenged the validity of the Nineteenth Amendment 
(the amendment that gave women the right to vote).83  The plaintiff 
claimed an interest in the case as a citizen and taxpayer and as a 
“member[] of the American Constitutional League,” an association 
that sought to protect “the fundamental principles of the American 
Constitution, and especially that which gives to each state the right to 
determine for itself the question as to who should exercise the elec-
tive franchise therein.”84  The Court dismissed the suit, stating that 
the plaintiff asserted “only the right, possessed by every citizen, to re-
quire that the government be administered according to law.”85  This 
“general right,” the Court declared, “[o]bviously . . . does not entitle 
a private citizen to institute” a suit in federal court.86 
The Court later applied the same principles to a purely private 
dispute.  In L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,87 the plain-
tiffs sought to prevent a railroad from taking action that would (al-
legedly) violate the Transportation Act of 1920.88  The Court held 
that, to bring the action, the plaintiffs had to allege “something more 
than a common concern for obedience to law.”89 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife90 confirmed that this limitation on pri-
vate party standing has constitutional underpinnings.  In Lujan, cer-
tain environmental organizations filed suit against the Department of 
Interior, challenging its regulatory interpretation of the Endangered 
 
 82 258 U.S. 126 (1922). 
 83 See id. at 127; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United 
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on ac-
count of sex.”). 
 84 Fairchild, 258 U.S. at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 85 Id. at 129. 
 86 Id. at 129–30. 
 87 311 U.S. 295 (1940). 
 88 See id. at 297. 
 89 Id. at 303. 
 90 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
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Species Act.91  After concluding that the plaintiffs failed to allege a 
cognizable injury,92 the Court held that the statute’s “citizen-suit” pro-
vision did not provide an alternative basis for standing.93 
The citizen-suit provision stated that “any person may commence 
a civil suit on his own behalf . . . to enjoin any person, including the 
United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agen-
cy . . . who is alleged to be in violation of” any provision of the En-
dangered Species Act or its implementing regulations.94  The Lujan 
Court found that Congress could not, consistent with Article III, con-
fer “upon all persons” this “abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental 
‘right’” to enforce federal law.95  The Court declared that a plaintiff 
asserting only an injury “to his and every citizen’s interest in proper 
application of the Constitution and laws . . . does not state an Article 
III case or controversy.”96 
 
 91 Id. at 557–59.  The statutory provision at issue requires each federal agency, in consulta-
tion with the Secretary of the Interior, to ensure that any action “authorized, funded, or 
carried out by [the] agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any 
endangered species.”  Id. at 558 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988)).  The plaintiffs 
in Lujan objected to a regulation stating that this consultation requirement did not apply 
to agency action in foreign countries.  See id. at 558–59. 
 92 See id. at 562–67.  The plaintiff organizations’ claim for standing rested in part on affida-
vits from two members.  See id. at 563–64.  Each member stated that she had previously 
observed an endangered species in a foreign country and that the existence of the species 
was now threatened by a project that received federal funds.  See id. at 563.  Each member 
also asserted that she planned to return to the location to view the species again.  See id. at 
563–64.  The Supreme Court held that the affidavits did not establish an injury-in-fact, 
because they failed to show that the affiants would “imminent[ly]” be harmed by the 
threat to the species.  See id. at 564 (internal quotation marks omitted).  According to the 
Court, the plaintiffs needed to have “concrete plans,” not simply “‘some day’ intentions,” 
to return to the foreign countries in order to demonstrate “‘actual or imminent’ injury.”  
Id. 
 93 See id. at 571–73. 
 94 Id. at 571–72 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988)). 
 95 See id. at 573. 
 96 Id. at 573–74.  Lujan did not announce a constitutional rule solely for cases against the 
federal government (or, more specifically, against the Executive Branch).  The Supreme 
Court and the courts of appeals have applied similar principles in lawsuits against non-
federal defendants.  See Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007) (rejecting a chal-
lenge to a Colorado law for lack of standing); L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 
311 U.S. 295, 303–04 (1940) (holding that the plaintiffs could not challenge the rail-
road’s conduct based solely on their interest in ensuring compliance with federal law); W. 
Pac. Cal. R.R. Co. v. S. Pac. Co., 284 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1931) (stating that to be a party-in-
interest, the complainant must have some definite legal right that is seriously threat-
ened); Am. Canoe Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Louisa Water & Sewer Comm’n, 389 F.3d 536, 
542, 546–47 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding a concrete and particularized injury sufficient to 
confer Article III standing); Crist v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, 262 F.3d 193, 195 
(2d Cir. 2001) (finding no particularized harm to allow standing against the Commission 
on Presidential Debates). 
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The Supreme Court has thus repeatedly found that a private 
plaintiff must allege “something more”97 than an interest in “seeing 
that the law is obeyed.”  But this “something more” cannot simply be 
an ideological interest in a particular area of law.  In Fairchild v. 
Hughes, for example, the Court indicated that the plaintiff could not 
challenge the Nineteenth Amendment simply by asserting a special 
interest in protecting each State’s alleged “right to determine for it-
self the question as to who should exercise the elective franchise 
therein.”98 
The Court made this point more explicit in Sierra Club v. Morton.99  
In Morton, a private interest group brought suit against the Depart-
ment of Interior to enjoin it from issuing permits for a development 
in a wilderness area.100  The organization asserted that it should have 
standing to bring the action in light of its “special interest in the con-
servation and the sound maintenance of the national parks, game re-
fuges and forests of the country.”101 
The Supreme Court rejected that claim.102  The organization’s 
“special interest” in environmental protection did not constitute a ju-
dicially cognizable interest.  The Court stated that, if “a mere interest 
in a problem” sufficed for standing, then “any individual citizen” with 
a “bona fide special interest” in a particular legal issue could file 
suit.103 
 
 97 L. Singer & Sons, 311 U.S. at 303–04. 
 98 258 U.S. 126, 127 (1922). 
 99 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
100 See id. at 730. 
101 Id. 
102 See id. at 738–41. 
103 Id. at 739–40 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court purported to adhere to 
these limitations on private party standing in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United 
States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).  Stevens involved the False Claims Act, which 
prohibits any person from making a fraudulent claim for payment to the federal govern-
ment, and allows private qui tam relators to enforce the provision by filing suit against an 
alleged violator.  See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1), 3730(b)(1) (2000); Stevens, 529 U.S. at 768, 
771–78.  The Court found that relators could (consistent with Article III) bring these 
suits, because they asserted the government’s “proprietary injury resulting from the al-
leged fraud,” rather than its abstract “sovereign[]” interest in law enforcement.  Id. at 
771, 773 (noting that the statute “can reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial as-
signment of the Government’s damages claim”(emphasis added)).  I do not claim that this 
distinction between “sovereign” and “proprietary” interests is necessarily coherent.  I note 
only that the Court’s analysis is superficially consistent with the cases holding that private 
parties lack standing to see that the law is obeyed.  A more extensive discussion of Stevens 
and the False Claims Act is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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B.  Standing Doctrine Curtails Private Prosecutorial Discretion 
The Supreme Court has never clearly identified the basis for the 
prohibition on abstract private grievances.  But the Court’s analysis in 
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church 
& State, Inc.104 suggests one concern that may be animating the Court:  
a concern that certain classes of injuries could give private individuals 
an unlimited amount of prosecutorial discretion.105 
In Valley Forge, a private interest group that advocates the separa-
tion of church and state, along with several of its employees, filed 
suit, challenging the federal government’s decision to convey federal 
property to a religious institution.106  The Supreme Court held that 
the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to assert an injury-
in-fact.107  The plaintiffs could not simply claim that “the Constitution 
has been violated.”108  Nor could they rely on a “special interest” in 
the Establishment Clause.  The Court concluded, as it had in Sierra 
Club v. Morton, that the plaintiffs’ “firm[] commit[ment] to the con-
stitutional principle of separation of church and State” was not in and 
of itself sufficient for standing.109 
Notably, the Court in Valley Forge seemed particularly disturbed by 
the fact that the plaintiffs were from the Washington, D.C. area and 
were challenging the conveyance of property located in Pennsyl-
vania.110  The Court emphasized that the plaintiffs only knew of the 
allegedly unconstitutional transfer of property because of a “news re-
lease.”111  The Court found that the plaintiffs had no cognizable in-
 
104 454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
105 Standing doctrine may, of course, also serve other values.  For insightful discussions, see 
Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III:  Perspectives on the “Case or Controversy” Re-
quirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 306–15 (1979) (arguing that standing protects the values 
of representation and self-determination); Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good for, 
93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1664 (2007) (contending that standing helps “prevent the inefficient 
disposition of constitutional entitlements”); and MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROCESS:  A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 159 (2000) 
(asserting that standing helps prevent litigants “from strategically timing cases . . . to ma-
nipulate the substantive evolution of constitutional doctrine”). 
106 454 U.S. at 469. 
107 See id. at 482–87. 
108 Id. at 485. 
109 Id. at 486 (“It is evident that [the plaintiffs] are firmly committed to the constitutional 
principle of separation of church and State, but standing is not measured by the intensity 
of the litigant’s interest or the fervor of his advocacy.”). 
110 See id. at 486–87. 
111 See id. at 469 (observing that the plaintiffs “learned of the conveyance through a news re-
lease”); id. at 486–87 (“[The plaintiffs] complain of a transfer of property located in 
Chester County, Pa. The named plaintiffs reside in Maryland and Virginia; their organiza-
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terest in this distant conduct:  they could not, simply by alleging a 
constitutional violation, confer upon themselves “a special license to 
roam the country in search of governmental wrongdoing” and “reveal 
their discoveries in federal court.”112 
1.  The Prosecutorial Discretion Conferred by “Abstract Concerns” 
The Court’s analysis in Valley Forge suggests the missing link in 
much of standing doctrine.  The Court indicated that a private plain-
tiff may not assert an injury that would allow her to “roam the country 
in search of” legal violations and initiate an enforcement action 
against the violator of her choice.  Put another way, a private plaintiff 
should not be permitted to file suit against any person, anywhere in 
the country, for any violation of law.  The Court thus suggested that a 
private plaintiff should not have standing to assert an injury that 
would give her an unlimited amount of prosecutorial discretion. 
What kinds of injuries would confer on a private plaintiff substan-
tial prosecutorial discretion?  One such injury appears to be the “in-
jury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed.”  As we have seen, 
the Executive Branch, in pursuing that law enforcement interest, has 
precisely the degree of prosecutorial discretion that the Court found 
impermissible for a private party.  The Executive Branch may “roam 
the country in search of” legal violations and bring suit against any 
person for any transgression.  There are certain legal and political 
constraints on executive enforcement discretion, but (as discussed 
below) virtually none of those limitations apply to private parties.  Ac-
cordingly, if a private party could assert the “interest in seeing that 
the law [was] obeyed,” she would have almost unlimited power to 
“roam the country in search of” legal violations and pursue the viola-
tor of her choice. 
But that is not the only abstract grievance that would give a private 
plaintiff such expansive prosecutorial discretion.  Other abstract in-
terests would give private plaintiffs a similar degree of discretionary 
enforcement authority.  As discussed, the Court in Sierra Club v. Mor-
ton and Valley Forge held that private parties lack standing to assert a 
“special interest” in—or a “firm[] commit[ment]” to—the enforce-
ment of a particular area of law.  The Supreme Court applied these 
 
tional headquarters are located in Washington, D.C.  They learned of the transfer 
through a news release.” (footnote omitted)). 
112 Id. at 487. 
  
808 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:4 
 
principles in Diamond v. Charles,113 when it held that a litigant could 
not simply allege a “conscientious objection to abortion.”114  Such an 
“abstract concern,” the Court declared, “does not substitute for the 
concrete injury required by Art. III.”115 
If a plaintiff had Article III standing to assert a “conscientious ob-
jection” to particular conduct (or a “special interest” in a particular 
area of law), there would seem to be no Article III means of limiting 
her discretion to file suit in federal court.  It does not appear that a 
federal court would ever have an “objective basis” for rejecting a 
would-be plaintiff’s assertion that she had a “bona fide” “special in-
terest” in a particular matter.116 
Thus, if a private plaintiff had standing to file suit, based solely on 
her own asserted “special interest,” she could become a self-
appointed enforcer of any area of federal law.  And she would have 
an extraordinary degree of prosecutorial discretion.  Her asserted 
“special interest” would allow her to bring suit against any person, an-
ywhere in the country, for any violation of her chosen field of federal 
law. 
2.  Standing Limits Private Prosecutorial Discretion 
We will soon explore why it may make sense to prevent private 
parties from exercising substantial prosecutorial discretion.  But we 
should first examine how standing doctrine curtails private prosecu-
torial discretion.  A private individual generally cannot file suit unless 
 
113 476 U.S. 54 (1986). 
114 Id. at 67. 
115 Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976)).  Diamond grew 
out of a constitutional challenge to a restrictive Illinois abortion statute.  See id. at 57–58.  
A physician (Diamond) intervened in the litigation, asserting that he had an interest in 
defending the statute because of his “conscientious objection to abortions.”  Id.  The low-
er courts later enjoined the enforcement of certain provisions of the state law and Illinois 
declined to further defend the statute.  See id. at 61.  Only Diamond sought review in the 
Supreme Court.  Id.  The Court held that, when a private intervenor such as Diamond is 
the sole party to appeal, he must satisfy the standing requirements of Article III.  See id. at 
68.  And, as noted in the text, the Court found that Diamond lacked standing because he 
suffered no judicially cognizable injury.  See id. at 71. 
116 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739–40 (1972) (“[I]f a ‘special interest’ in [envi-
ronmental protection] were enough to entitle the Sierra Club to commence this litiga-
tion, there would appear to be no objective basis upon which to disallow a suit by any 
other bona fide ‘special interest’ organization, however small or short-lived.  And if any 
group with a bona fide ‘special interest’ could initiate such litigation, it is difficult to per-
ceive why any individual citizen with the same bona fide special interest would not also be 
entitled to do so.”). 
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she has suffered a concrete injury-in-fact.117  That injury further cabins 
her prosecutorial discretion by defining which defendants she can 
hale into court.  She can sue only the party (or parties) that caused 
the legally cognizable harm.118  And she can seek redress (in the form 
of damages or injunctive relief) only for the harm that she suffered 
and/or to prevent that harm from occurring or recurring.119  The in-
jury-in-fact requirement of standing doctrine thus, to a large extent, 
determines the scope of a plaintiff’s prosecutorial discretion. 
Let’s examine how the Supreme Court has managed to curtail 
private prosecutorial discretion, even as it has relaxed the standing 
requirements for private plaintiffs.  As noted, a private plaintiff may 
bring suit only when she suffers an injury-in-fact.  Accordingly, when 
the Court recognizes new injuries as judicially cognizable, that in-
creases the likelihood that a private party can file suit.  And, over the 
past several decades, the Court has expanded the realm of injuries to 
encompass vote dilution,120 racial gerrymandering,121 an aesthetic in-
terest in a wilderness area,122 and an interest in the preservation of a 
species of wildlife.123 
But, even as the Court has recognized new injuries-in-fact, it has 
(albeit imperfectly124) consistently defined the relevant injury in a way 
that cabins private prosecutorial discretion.  The Court, as an initial 
matter, defines the injury in a manner that limits the pool of poten-
tial prosecutors.  Often, the parameters established by the Court are 
 
117 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 225 (2003). 
118 See, e.g., Simon, 426 U.S. at 40–44 (holding that indigent plaintiffs, who were denied 
treatment at certain tax-exempt hospitals, lacked standing to sue the Internal Revenue 
Service, because their injury—the denial of care—was caused by the hospital rather than 
by the IRS); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617–18 (1973) (holding that a mother 
could not bring suit against a state prosecutor for failing to enforce the child support laws 
on behalf of children born out-of-wedlock, because the mother “made no showing that 
her failure to secure support payments [from her own child’s father] result[ed] from the 
nonenforcement”). 
119 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) (“[A] 
plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.”).  I do not 
mean to dispute that, once a private plaintiff demonstrates an injury-in-fact, she may seek 
“broad injunctive relief” or other remedies that are “not necessarily coterminous with” 
her personal injury.  See Morrison, supra note 11, at 603–04.  But she must nevertheless 
target the particular illegal conduct that injured her.  See infra text accompanying notes 
124–35. 
120 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207–08 (1962). 
121 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993). 
122 See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183; Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 
U.S. 59, 73–74, 74 n.18 (1978). 
123 See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986). 
124 For insightful critiques of the Court’s standing jurisprudence, see supra notes 5–7, 27. 
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geographic.  In the racial gerrymandering context, for example, the 
plaintiff must reside in one of the (allegedly poorly drawn) majority-
minority districts.125  Likewise, in the vote dilution context, the plain-
tiff must reside in the area where her votes will (allegedly) be ac-
corded less weight.126 
The definition of the relevant injury-in-fact then determines the 
scope of each potential plaintiff’s prosecutorial discretion.  A plaintiff 
who brings a vote dilution claim has the discretion to file suit only 
against the governmental entity that drew the (allegedly unlawful) 
district lines.  And she can challenge—and seek redress for—only the 
alleged vote dilution.  She lacks standing to see that all aspects of 
election law are obeyed. 
Along similar lines, in environmental cases, the Court has defined 
each injury in a way that limits both the pool of potential prosecutors, 
and cabins each potential plaintiff’s prosecutorial discretion.  To 
some extent, as in the voting rights context, the parameters estab-
lished by the Court are geographic.  An individual can generally file 
an enforcement action if she resides near a facility that has allegedly 
polluted the surrounding air or water, claiming that the pollution has 
adversely affected her health or negatively impacted the value of her 
property.127  The Court has also focused on “actual use,” i.e., whether 
a complaining individual regularly spends time in a particular wil-
derness area or views a particular endangered species.128 
The definition of the relevant injury then, in turn, determines the 
prosecutorial discretion of any would-be plaintiff.  The affected indi-
vidual can bring suit against only the particular defendant (or defen-
 
125 See Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531 U.S. 28, 29–31 (2000); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 
744–45 (1995). 
126 See Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 330–34 (1999); 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207–08 (1962). 
127 See Laidlaw., 528 U.S. at 182–84 (holding that an environmental organization had stand-
ing, in part because a member of the organization lived near the defendant hazardous 
waste facility and alleged that the pollution caused by the facility reduced the value of her 
property); Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 67, 73–74 (concluding that the plaintiffs—“40 individu-
als who live within close proximity to the planned [nuclear power] facilities”—alleged a 
cognizable injury, given that the emissions from such facilities can cause adverse “health 
and genetic consequences”). 
128 See, e.g., Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183 (“[E]nvironmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in 
fact when they aver that they use the affected area and are persons ‘for whom the aes-
thetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened’ by the challenged activity.” 
(quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972))); Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 
230 n.4 (noting that the plaintiffs “undoubtedly have alleged a sufficient ‘injury in fact’ in 
that the whale watching and studying of their members will be adversely affected by con-
tinued whale harvesting”). 
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dants) whose conduct has harmed (or threatens to harm) her health; 
the value of her property; the wilderness area that she uses; or the 
species that she enjoys viewing.  She lacks standing to “roam the 
country in search of” other violations of environmental laws—even 
other violations by the same defendant—and “reveal [her] discover-
ies in federal court.” 
This analysis helps to explain the Court’s willingness to consider 
certain establishment clause challenges on the merits, even as it de-
nied standing to the plaintiffs in Valley Forge.129  The Court has, for ex-
ample, ruled on allegations that local government crèche and Ten 
Commandments displays violate the Establishment Clause—without 
so much as mentioning standing.130  Significantly, the plaintiffs who 
brought these suits had more than just an abstract interest in prevent-
ing government endorsement of religion.  Each suit was brought in 
part by local residents who lived near and actually observed the chal-
lenged religious displays.131  The plaintiffs thus had the discretion to 
contest only the particular display in their community and to seek re-
dress only for that harm.  These plaintiffs were not given the more 
general authority to “see that [the Establishment Clause] is ob-
eyed.”132 
 
129 Many thanks to Richard Fallon for suggesting this application of the standing theory pre-
sented here. 
130 See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 850, 881 (2005) (holding that a Ten Com-
mandments display on a county courthouse violates the Establishment Clause); Van Or-
den v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691–92 (2005) (holding that a Ten Commandments display on 
state capitol grounds does not violate the Establishment Clause); County of Allegheny v. 
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989) (holding that a crèche display at a county courthouse is 
unconstitutional); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that a city’s 
crèche display is constitutional). 
131 See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 682; Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 587–88; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671–72; 
ACLU v. McCreary County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 679, 682 (E.D. Ky. 2000) (“[T]he plaintiffs 
here have standing because they must come into contact with the display of the Ten 
Commandments whenever they enter the courthouse to conduct business.”). 
132 I do not separately discuss establishment clause challenges based on taxpayer standing, 
which are governed by distinct rules.  The general rule is that private parties lack standing 
to challenge government conduct based solely on their status as federal taxpayers.  See 
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923).  Although the Court in Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U.S. 83 (1968), carved out an exception to this rule for establishment clause chal-
lenges to federal expenditures, the Court has gradually narrowed the Flast exception so 
that it covers only challenges to certain exercises of congressional power under the 
Spending Clause.  See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2568 
(2007) (holding that federal taxpayers may challenge only government expenditures that 
are “expressly authorized or mandated by a[] specific congressional enactment”).  A full 
discussion of taxpayer standing is beyond the scope of this Article.  But, as noted below, 
the constitutional analysis here may offer an alternative rationale for the Court’s decision 
to grant standing in Flast and deny it in Valley Forge.  See infra note 210. 
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Private organizations do tend to have a larger degree of prosecu-
torial discretion than an individual plaintiff.  A private interest group 
may bring an enforcement action against any defendant whose con-
duct has injured one of the organization’s members, as long as the 
lawsuit is germane to its purposes.133  An organization with a nation-
wide membership will often be able to satisfy this requirement, and 
will therefore retain the prosecutorial discretion to pursue a number 
of offenses (and/or offenders).  For example, in Sierra Club v. Morton, 
the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff organization lacked 
standing to challenge a recreational development near a wilderness 
area, based solely on its “special interest” in environmental protec-
tion.134  But, the Court indicated, the organization could have 
brought the identical suit if it had alleged that one of its members 
would be harmed by the development (perhaps because that person 
lived near the wilderness area and hiked there).135 
The prosecutorial discretion of such a private interest group is 
still, however, not coextensive with that of the Executive Branch.  A 
private organization is limited to filing suits against defendants whose 
conduct harms the interests of the organization’s members. Thus, 
like an individual plaintiff, a private organization lacks Article III 
standing to “roam the country in search of” any violation of federal 
law (or even a particular subset of federal law) and “reveal [its] dis-
coveries in federal court.” 
 
133 See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (“[A]n associa-
tion has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when:  (a) its members would 
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are 
germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief 
requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”); see also Unit-
ed Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 
556–57 (1996) (concluding that the third prong of this test is not a constitutional re-
quirement).  Notably, the standard for “germaneness” is not a particularly exacting one.  
See Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 233 F.3d 625, 636 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
134 405 U.S. 727, 738–40 (1972). 
135 See id. at 735 (“Nowhere in the pleadings or affidavits did the [Sierra] Club state that its 
members use [the wilderness area].”); id. at 735 n.8 (noting that the plaintiff could seek 
leave to amend its complaint to allege such an injury).  Indeed, it appears that the plain-
tiff in Morton could have satisfied the requirements for organizational standing.  Accord-
ing to an amicus brief, the plaintiff organization did have members that used the wilder-
ness area at issue.  See id.  The organization, however, declined to rely on the interests of 
its members.  See id. 
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C.  Policy Bases for Curtailing Private Prosecutorial Discretion 
But why would we place these limitations on private enforcement 
actions?  After all, private attorneys general often perform a valuable 
law enforcement function.  Private actions (when they proceed to the 
merits) can and plainly do help serve the public interest in “seeing 
that the law is obeyed,” whether it be in the civil rights context;136 the 
environmental context;137 or the commercial context (especially with 
respect to antitrust138 and securities law).139 
Moreover, it seems quite possible that conferring standing on an 
unlimited number of private prosecutors to “see that the law is ob-
eyed” would be a way to solve some of the law enforcement difficul-
ties faced by the Executive Branch.  As noted above, the Executive 
Branch lacks sufficient financial resources to pursue every violation of 
federal law; millions of private attorneys general should be able to 
pick up much of the slack.  Indeed, private plaintiffs that are able to 
satisfy the requirements of current standing law often perform that 
very function.140 
But we should keep in mind that private attorneys general do not 
constitute (and should not have to constitute) a cohesive group, 
working together in pursuit of a common public goal.  Thus, in eva-
luating the prosecutorial capacities of private attorneys general, each 
must be considered a separate and distinct entity.  And, once we look 
at would-be private plaintiffs on this individual basis, we can see pol-
icy reasons for preventing every private party in the country from ex-
 
136 See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972); Newman v. Piggie Park 
Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968) (“When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it 
was evident that . . . the Nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a 
means of securing broad compliance with the law.”). 
137 See Sandra B. Zellmer, The Virtues of ‘Command and Control’ Regulation:  Barring Exotic Species 
from Aquatic Ecosystems, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1233, 1267 (noting the importance of private 
enforcement of environmental laws). 
138 See Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 572 n.10 (1982) 
(“[P]rivate suits are an important element of the Nation’s antitrust enforcement effort:  
. . . ‘[They] provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available to the De-
partment of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring violations.’” (quoting 
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979))); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006) (authorizing 
private antitrust actions). 
139 See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (“[I]mplied 
private actions provide ‘a most effective weapon in the enforcement’ of the securities laws 
and are ‘a necessary supplement to [Securities & Exchange] Commission action’” (quot-
ing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964))). 
140 See supra notes 136–39; Stephenson, supra note 53, at 107–08. 
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ercising the same degree of prosecutorial discretion as the Executive 
Branch. 
1.  A Hypothetical Private Attorney General 
Let’s examine whether a private plaintiff, who brings an enforce-
ment action, means to serve as a “representative of the [entire] pub-
lic.”141  Assume for a moment that we have conferred upon a private 
attorney general Article III standing to see that an area of federal law 
is obeyed.  We will use bankruptcy law as a paradigm.  Assume that 
our private attorney general (a private nonprofit organization) chose 
this field because of its “special interest” in protecting lower-level 
employees who are adversely affected by corporate reorganizations.  
To facilitate our private attorney general’s “special interest,” we will 
allow it to “roam the country in search of” violations of the Bank-
ruptcy Code and “reveal [its] discoveries in federal court.”142 
But, of course, like the Executive Branch, our private attorney 
general will have only a finite amount of resources to pursue these 
legal violations.  Thus, like the Executive Branch, the private attorney 
general must choose which statutory violations to pursue.  Presuma-
bly, it will focus on the violations that relate to its “special interest”:  
protecting the employees of corporate debtors.  Accordingly, our pri-
vate attorney general will be motivated to bring suit against any cor-
porate debtor that fails to comply with the statutory provisions pro-
tecting employees’ collective bargaining agreements143 and retirement 
benefits.144 
But our private attorney general may not spend its limited re-
sources enforcing statutory provisions that do not further its “special 
interest.”  For example, the Bankruptcy Code requires a corporate 
debtor to pay its post-petition contractors before paying virtually any 
other creditor.145 This is clearly an important requirement of the 
 
141 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 736 (1972). 
142 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 
U.S. 464, 487 (1982). 
143 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (b)(1)(A) (2006) (stating that a debtor may modify a collective bar-
gaining agreement only as “necessary to permit . . . reorganization” and must ensure that 
“all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably”). 
144 See 11 U.S.C. § 1114(e)(1) (2006) (requiring that the debtor “timely pay and . . . not mod-
ify” retirement benefits except by agreement of the parties or by court order). 
145 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b), 507(a)(2) (stating that such expenses are “administrative ex-
penses,” which are given high priority under the Code); Chao v. Hosp. Staffing Servs., 
Inc., 270 F.3d 374, 383 (6th Cir. 2001).  Such “administrative expenses” also include the 
post-petition wages of a debtor corporation’s employees.  See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A)(i).  
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Code.  The debtor could not reorganize if it could not obtain the 
goods and services to conduct its business; and, without such a prom-
ise of payment, other companies would be disinclined to do business 
with a debtor in bankruptcy.146  But the payment of such expenses re-
duces the amount available to other creditors, including the employ-
ees and former employees of the debtor corporation.  Thus, if a 
debtor fails to pay one of its post-petition contractors, our private at-
torney general is unlikely to pursue that statutory violation, which 
does not serve—and, in fact, tends to undermine—its “special inter-
est.” 
The Bankruptcy Code, like most federal law, reflects a wide range 
of interests, not all of which are consistent with—or even particularly 
relevant to—our private attorney general’s own “special interest.”  
Our private attorney general has no interest in using its scarce re-
sources to see that every provision of the Bankruptcy Code is obeyed. 
This reasoning is not limited to the bankruptcy context.  We like-
wise do not expect an organization focused on environmental protec-
tion to pursue just “any” violation of federal environmental law.  Such 
an organization is not likely to file suit on behalf of a corporation 
whose request for a permit to discharge pollutants under the Clean 
Water Act may have been improperly denied.147  Such an improper 
denial would constitute “any” violation of federal environmental law 
and, indeed, it may be a violation that Congress would want pursued.  
Nevertheless, a permit denial is not a transgression that we expect to 
trigger a lawsuit by a private conservation group.  On the contrary, we 
expect—indeed, many of us hope—that such a group will bring en-
forcement actions to further its “special interest in the conservation 
and the sound maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and 
forests of the country.”148 
2.  The Lack of Constraints on Private Prosecutorial Discretion 
The above discussion suggests some important differences be-
tween the Executive Branch and private parties, which help explain 
 
Our private attorney general would be inclined to ensure that a debtor made those pay-
ments. 
146 See In re FBI Distrib. Corp., 330 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2003). 
147 Under the Clean Water Act, a person that plans to discharge pollutants into the nation’s 
waters must apply to the Environmental Protection Agency for a “national pollution dis-
charge elimination system” (“NPDES”) permit.  See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342 (2000).  
An applicant may seek review of an adverse decision.  See id. § 1369(b)(1)(F). 
148 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 730 (1972). 
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why our legal system places greater limitations on private prosecuto-
rial discretion.  First, in contrast to the Executive Branch, a private 
party has no constitutional obligation to “faithfully” execute the laws.  
Accordingly, a private party is free to ignore certain provisions of law 
and refuse to enforce them when they do not comport with its “spe-
cial interest.”  Likewise, a private party has no duty to adopt nation-
ally uniform enforcement policies.  A private party is free to focus on 
tobacco litigation in Virginia or immigration rights in Arizona, and 
need not consider how those actions will affect overall enforcement 
efforts. 
Nor do we expect a private party to abide by what I have described 
as the “nondiscrimination” principle.  Certainly, no one complains 
that a private organization might be “captured” by a special interest 
or that it may bring suits to advance only certain ideological goals.  
Indeed, those are the defining features of a private interest group.  
But private parties are also free to ignore the other half of the non-
discrimination principle articulated above.  Although the Constitu-
tion prohibits the Executive Branch from targeting ideological oppo-
nents or individuals of a particular ethnicity, these restrictions do not 
apply to private prosecutorial discretion.149  In Federal Election Commis-
sion v. Akins,150 for example, a group of plaintiff voters brought suit 
against the FEC, urging it to require the American Israel Public Af-
fairs Committee (“AIPAC”) to make certain disclosures about its po-
litical activities.151  As the Court observed, the plaintiffs sought the in-
formation about AIPAC because they “often opposed” the political 
positions taken by AIPAC.152  The Court did not suggest that there was 
anything unlawful about a private enforcement action motivated by 
the plaintiffs’ ideological opposition to a particular group. 
Private parties’ freedom from these constitutional restrictions 
would raise troubling possibilities if they had the authority to see that 
any area of federal law was obeyed.  A private group might, for exam-
ple, assert a “conscientious objection” to undocumented workers, and 
therefore declare a “special interest” in enforcing federal immigra-
tion law.  Like the private attorneys general discussed above, this self-
 
149 The Constitution, with a few exceptions (such as the Thirteenth Amendment), restricts 
only the actions of governmental entities.  See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 
U.S. 614, 619 (1991).  The conduct of private parties “violates the Constitution only when 
it may be attributed to state action.”  Id.; see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 
171–73, 177 (1972). 
150 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
151 See id. at 13–16. 
152 Id. at 15–16. 
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appointed watchdog of immigration law would have only a finite 
amount of resources, and would thus focus only on the parts of im-
migration law that furthered its “special interest.”  Accordingly, the 
interest group would likely concentrate on the statutory provisions 
requiring removal of certain aliens,153 and would be less concerned 
about the laws permitting other immigrants to remain in the country 
as refugees.154 
Alternatively, as in Diamond v. Charles, a private plaintiff might as-
sert a “conscientious objection to abortions,”155 and therefore claim a 
“special interest” in enforcing restrictions on federal funding of abor-
tions.156  Conversely, a private interest group might assert a “conscien-
tious objection” to persons who interfere with family planning ser-
vices, and thus claim a “special interest” in enforcing the Freedom of 
Access to Clinics Entrances Act.157  Such a private attorney general 
might be inclined to use its finite resources to enforce this law against 
members of pro-life interest groups, because—analogous to Federal 
Election Commission v. Akins—its views are “often opposed” to such 
groups.  There do not appear to be any legal constraints on such 
ideologically motivated private enforcement actions.158 
And that leads us to the final distinction between the Executive 
Branch and private parties:  accountability.  I do not dispute that it is 
difficult to hold the Executive Branch accountable for its discretion-
ary enforcement decisions.  But, as challenging as it is to hold the Ex-
 
153 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2000) (setting forth the classes of deportable aliens). 
154 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006) (providing that an individual who 
qualifies as a “refugee” may be granted asylum). 
155 476 U.S. 54, 57–58 (1986). 
156 Since 1976, Congress has, via either an appropriations measure or a joint resolution, pro-
hibited the use of federal Medicaid funds for abortions.  This restriction is commonly 
known as the “Hyde Amendment.”  See Pub. L. No. 108–99, §§ 508, 509, 118 Stat. 277 
(2004) (prohibiting the use of federal Medicaid funds for abortion except in cases of 
rape, incest, and when the mother’s life would be endangered by the pregnancy); Harris 
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302 (1980); see also id. at 326–27 (rejecting a constitutional chal-
lenge to the funding restriction). 
157 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2006).  The statute prohibits the “intentional[] . . . intimidat[ion]” of 
persons “obtaining or providing reproductive health services.”  Id. § 248(a)(1). 
158 Other commentators have raised similar concerns.  See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as 
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1445 (2003) (“Private delegates’ exemption from 
constitutional constraints means that they can wield these government powers in ways 
that raise serious abuse of power concerns. Imagine, for example, an individual who 
commences a meritless suit for civil penalties against a company out of spite or because its 
owners are African American.”); see also Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 23, at 731 (ob-
serving, with respect to qui tam actions, that “there are obvious dangers in a system that 
permits prosecutorial discretion to reside in each of 250 million autonomous decision-
makers who are self-appointed and out for their own financial gain”). 
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ecutive Branch accountable, it would be far more difficult to con-
strain the prosecutorial discretion of a private party, if she too could 
bring suit to see that the law was obeyed. 
Virtually none of the checks on executive enforcement discretion 
apply to private parties.  Private enforcement decisions are not sub-
ject to judicial review for the simple reason that there are no constitu-
tional or other legal restrictions to enforce.159  Nor are there political 
constraints.  Private parties clearly need not abide by any enforce-
ment guidelines issued by the Executive Branch.  Nor are they subject 
to the congressional appropriations process.160  In fact, the only con-
straint that would seem to apply to both the Executive Branch and 
private parties is a change in the law.  Given the time-consuming na-
ture of the legislative process, it seems doubtful that Congress would 
narrow a statute solely to curtail private prosecutorial discretion.  But, 
even in the (unlikely) event that Congress took that step, it would 
have only a limited effect.  A private party would still have the author-
ity to sue any person for any violation of the (somewhat narrowed) 
provision.  Indeed, the other checks on the Executive Branch’s en-
forcement discretion are critical precisely because statutes themselves 
do not significantly limit that discretion. 
Some may argue that private enforcement actions can themselves 
serve as a check on executive enforcement discretion.161  Private par-
ties may bring suit against private entities that have gone unnoticed 
by (or, worse, have captured) the relevant administrative agency.  Al-
ternatively, private parties might bring suit directly against an agency, 
urging it to change its enforcement policies or to do a better job of 
enforcing certain provisions of law.  Private actions can thereby serve 
not only to supplement, but to compensate for, lax executive en-
forcement efforts.  This is undoubtedly a strong argument in favor of 
private enforcement of the law.  But it is not an argument for private 
prosecutorial discretion.  Indeed, this argument seems to presume 
 
159 See Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive:  Congressional Delegations of Administra-
tive Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 104 (1990) (“Delegations 
to private attorneys general . . . are immune from most external supervision—judicial 
oversight does not extend to their motives or strategy.”). 
160 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 39–40 (1975) (observing that, although “the annual appropriations hearing af-
fords the legislature an opportunity to assure that [an] agency has not strayed too far,” 
“[t]here is no corresponding check in private enforcement”). 
161 See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 647 (arguing that Congress may authorize private enforce-
ment actions because it has “concluded that the agency (or private defendant) is not en-
tirely reliable on its own and that relevant people should have access to the courts in or-
der to ensure that the . . . law is enforced”). 
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that the Executive Branch will abuse its immense enforcement discre-
tion—that it will favor certain groups, while disfavoring others, or en-
force certain laws, while neglecting others—and that such abuse is a 
bad thing.  Such an argument, which rests on concerns about the 
abuse of prosecutorial discretion, does not seem to justify giving every 
private individual and organization the same degree of prosecutorial 
discretion. 
Some commentary suggests that Congress could pass legislation to 
curtail private prosecutorial discretion.162  But it may be difficult for 
Congress to require private parties to adhere to the same require-
ments as the Executive Branch, without running afoul of other con-
stitutional constraints.  For example, the First Amendment protects 
private parties’ interest in selectively enforcing the law, bringing suits 
solely to advance their ideological “special interests.”163  Accordingly, 
Congress could not easily restrict private parties’ authority to pick 
and choose among the laws that they enforce.  The First Amendment 
may also limit Congress’s power to regulate ideologically motivated 
lawsuits; it is doubtful that a statute reading “no suit may be brought 
against a plaintiff’s ideological opponent” would pass constitutional 
muster.  In any event, as one commentator observes, it seems unlikely 
that Congress would enact any such restrictions on private prosecuto-
rial discretion.164  Given the lack of alternative constraints, standing 
doctrine seems to serve a useful purpose by curtailing private prose-
cutorial discretion. 
Notably, the problem to be addressed is not private enforcement 
of the law.  Private parties who demonstrate an injury-in-fact often 
serve the public interest in seeing that the law is obeyed, and such 
lawsuits should be encouraged.  But it does not seem that every private 
individual and organization in the country should have the discretion 
to sue any person for any legal violation.  Standing doctrine (cor-
rectly, in my view) permits the former but prohibits the latter.  It may 
 
162 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 587 
(2000) (“Congress could extend the procedural requirements of the [Administrative Pro-
cedure Act]—or any other good-government statute—to private actors.”). 
163 See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429–30 (1963) (concluding that a lawsuit can itself be 
“a form of political expression” protected by the First Amendment and “may well be the 
sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances”); see also 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (observing that the First Amendment’s Free 
Speech Clause protects the “freedom to associate with others for the common advance-
ment of political beliefs and ideas”). 
164 See Freeman, supra note 162, at 591 (“Congress and the states will likely balk at excessively 
proceduralizing private institutions.  In short, private actors will escape most traditional 
constraints most of the time.”). 
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be troubling that the Executive Branch exercises considerable prose-
cutorial discretion in fulfilling its constitutional duty to enforce fed-
eral law.  But at least the Executive Branch is subject to a degree of 
judicial and congressional oversight.  It seems unwise to transfer such 
discretionary enforcement authority to a private party that is “unen-
cumbered by the legal and practical checks” that constrain “public 
enforcement agencies.”165 
D.  A Constitutional Foundation for Standing Doctrine 
To state the policy rationale for standing doctrine is also to sug-
gest its constitutional justification.  Much of our constitutional struc-
ture is designed “to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.”166  The 
term “arbitrary,” as used here, refers to the improper exercise of dis-
cretionary power, i.e., random, uneven, or discriminatory decision-
making.  The Constitution in various respects prohibits the govern-
ment itself from acting arbitrarily:  Several provisions of the Bill of 
Rights are enforced by prophylactic rules that constrain administra-
tive discretion, and thereby seek to prevent arbitrary exercises of dis-
cretion.167 
 
165 Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 678, 679–80 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the de-
nial of certiorari) (observing that, under California law, private parties may bring certain 
suits “even though they themselves have suffered no harm,” and expressing concern that 
such plaintiffs “potentially constitute a large and hostile crowd freely able to bring prose-
cutions designed to vindicate their beliefs, and to do so unencumbered by the legal and 
practical checks” on “public enforcement agencies”); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex 
Co., 473 U.S. 479, 504 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing that, in private suits 
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, “the restraining influ-
ence of [public] prosecutors is completely absent”). 
166 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
167 Arbitrary exercises of discretion are prohibited by the First Amendment’s Free Speech 
Clause, see City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757, 772 (1988) (in-
validating a licensing scheme that gave the mayor “unfettered discretion” to deny permit 
applications for news racks); the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979) (stating that 
the Fourth Amendment “impose[s] a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of 
discretion by government officials . . . to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals 
against arbitrary invasions” (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted)); the Due 
Process Clause, see City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56, 60–64 (1999) (invalidating 
a local ordinance that failed to “establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement” 
and thereby created a significant “potential for arbitrary enforcement”); and the Equal 
Protection Clause, see Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (stating 
that the Equal Protection Clause protects against “intentional and arbitrary discrimina-
tion, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution 
through duly constituted agents”). 
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The Constitution also proscribes arbitrary action in another way.  
It prohibits the government from delegating certain discretionary 
functions to nongovernmental actors.  Various constitutional rules—
ranging from the Article I nondelegation doctrine168 to the due proc-
ess and establishment clause contexts169—prohibit the government (at 
least in theory170) from delegating broad discretionary power to pri-
vate parties. 
I assert that similar principles apply to the Take Care Clause of Ar-
ticle II, at least insofar as it requires the Executive Branch to exercise 
the broad prosecutorial discretion to “see that federal law is ob-
eyed.”171  Such discretion creates a significant potential for abuse, 
even when it is exercised by a governmental entity that is subject to 
constitutional and other legal and political constraints.  Such con-
cerns would only be heightened in the context of private prosecuto-
rial discretion, because private parties are subject to virtually none of 
those restrictions.  Accordingly, the Constitution does not permit the 
delegation of such expansive discretionary enforcement authority to 
private parties. 
This Article II nondelegation principle provides a constitutional 
explanation for much of Article III standing doctrine.  Standing en-
sures that private parties cannot exercise the broad prosecutorial dis-
cretion that the Executive Branch exercises when it enforces federal 
law.  Standing doctrine, in short, enforces the Article II nondelega-
tion doctrine by curtailing private prosecutorial discretion. 
 
168 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521–22, 537 (1935) (in-
validating the National Industrial Recovery Act, which permitted private trade and indus-
trial associations to create codes of fair competition for much of the economy); see also 
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944) (stating that the problem in Schechter was 
that “[t]he function of formulating the codes was delegated, not to a public official re-
sponsible to Congress or the Executive, but to private individuals engaged in the indus-
tries to be regulated”). 
169 See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 117, 125–27 (1982) (invalidating on Es-
tablishment Clause grounds a state law that permitted churches to veto applications for 
liquor licenses, and stating that “important, discretionary governmental powers” may not 
be “delegated to or shared with religious institutions”); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 
238, 310–11 (1936) (invalidating on due process grounds the Bituminous Coal Conserva-
tion Act, which delegated rulemaking authority to coal producers and miners). 
170 The Article I nondelegation doctrine serves largely as a “theoretical” prohibition because, 
as many commentators have observed, courts have not found a judicially manageable 
standard for enforcing it.  See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon 
of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 241–42 (2000) (noting that there is no “reliable met-
ric” for determining when “a statute confers too much discretion”). 
171 I do not argue that other Article II functions are nondelegable.  Such a claim is beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
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1.  An Article II Nondelegation Doctrine 
The Take Care Clause imposes a duty upon the Executive Branch 
to see that federal law is obeyed.  That provision thus also requires 
the Executive Branch to exercise the degree of prosecutorial discre-
tion necessary to fulfill that law enforcement function.  That is an 
immense responsibility.  The authority to “see that federal law is ob-
eyed” allows the Executive Branch to sue any person, anywhere in the 
country, for any legal violation.  To have even a semblance of a co-
herent enforcement system, the Executive Branch must translate that 
broad authority into more concrete enforcement policies.  Then each 
individual executive enforcement official must apply those policies in 
particular cases.  Throughout this process, executive enforcement of-
ficials must make discretionary judgment calls as they determine 
which of the innumerable violations of federal law to pursue in fed-
eral court. 
The Take Care Clause not only imposes this discretionary law en-
forcement responsibility on the Executive Branch.  It also prohibits 
Congress and the Executive Branch from delegating that authority to 
private parties.  Private parties may not exercise the broad prosecuto-
rial discretion that inevitably accompanies the authority to see that 
federal law is obeyed. 
This Article II nondelegation doctrine is rooted in a central prem-
ise of our constitutional order:  the need for structural checks against 
the exercise of arbitrary power.  As the commentary on executive en-
forcement discretion makes clear, the degree of prosecutorial discre-
tion involved in seeing that federal law is obeyed creates a serious po-
tential for abuse.  Justice Jackson aptly observed that “[l]aw 
enforcement is not automatic.  It isn’t blind.”172  Instead, it depends 
on the judgments of individual enforcement officials, who have tre-
mendous leeway to choose the targets of their enforcement actions.  
And, although executive enforcement officials are supposed to exer-
cise their discretion in an evenhanded and nondiscriminatory man-
ner, the authority to sue any person for any violation of federal law 
allows them to act in a far less reputable fashion:   
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that he can 
choose his defendants.  Therein is the most dangerous power of the 
prosecutor:  that he will pick people that he thinks he should get, rather 
than pick cases that need to be prosecuted.  With the law books filled 
with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance of 
 
172 Jackson, supra note 59, at 5. 
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finding at least a technical violation of some act on the part of almost an-
yone. . . . It is in this realm—in which the prosecutor picks some person 
whom he dislikes or desires to embarrass, or selects some group of un-
popular persons and then looks for an offense, that the greatest danger 
of abuse of prosecuting power lies.  It is here that law enforcement be-
comes personal, and the real crime becomes that of being unpopular 
with the predominant or governing group, being attached to the wrong 
political views, or being personally obnoxious to or in the way of the 
prosecutor himself.173 
Justice Jackson was not alone in recognizing that the immense prose-
cutorial discretion exercised by the Executive Branch carries with it 
this potential for abuse.  Other commentators have raised similar 
concerns about the arbitrary exercise of executive enforcement dis-
cretion.174  Given these concerns, there may be, as Justice Jackson 
suggested, only one reason to allow anyone to exercise such broad dis-
cretionary enforcement authority:  “[I]t seems necessary that such a 
power to prosecute be lodged somewhere.”175  So the Take Care 
Clause lodges that power in a governmental entity that is subject to 
constitutional requirements, congressional oversight, and judicial re-
view.  Those legal and political checks, we hope, will prevent most 
abuses of executive enforcement discretion. 
The concerns about executive enforcement discretion suggest 
why, as a constitutional matter, such prosecutorial discretion may not 
be delegated to private parties.  If a private plaintiff had the discre-
tion to sue any person, anywhere in the country, for any violation of 
law, she too would have the “most dangerous power of the prosecu-
tor”—the power to target the defendants of her choice.  And, as Gil-
 
173 Id. 
174 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction:  An Arbitrariness Approach, 
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1686–97 (2004) (arguing that courts should conduct more search-
ing review of enforcement decisions to “prevent[] . . . arbitrary agency decisionmaking”); 
Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race:  The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 13, 20 (1998) (“The deficiency of prosecutorial discretion lies not in its existence, 
but in the randomness and arbitrariness of its application.”); Kenneth Culp Davis, Admin-
istrative Powers of Supervising, Prosecuting, Advising, Declaring and Informally Adjudicating, 63 
HARV. L. REV. 193, 218–25 (1949) (arguing that administrative agencies’ enforcement 
discretion creates the potential for “[a]dministrative arbitrariness”); James Vorenberg, 
Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1553 (1981) (noting “the po-
tential for arbitrariness and discrimination that such discretion creates”); see also Thomas, 
supra note 58, at 152 (asserting that agencies should adopt enforcement guidelines to 
“eliminat[e] the randomness and arbitrariness of individual enforcement decisions by in-
dividual agency personnel”). 
175 Jackson, supra note 59, at 3 (“These powers have been granted to our law-enforcement 
agencies because it seems necessary that such a power to prosecute be lodged some-
where.”). 
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lian Metzger has observed, “[p]rivate delegates’ exemption” from the 
legal and political checks on the Executive Branch “means that they 
can wield [such] government powers in ways that raise serious abuse 
of power concerns.”176  Private parties not only could bring suit 
against any person for any legal violation, but also would have far 
greater freedom than the Executive Branch to target ideological op-
ponents, persons of a particular ethnicity, or individuals that they 
found “personally obnoxious.”  The Article II nondelegation doctrine 
prohibits private entities from exercising this “most dangerous pow-
er” and thereby serves as a prophylactic barrier against the arbitrary 
exercise of private prosecutorial discretion. 
This Article II nondelegation principle appears to be a logical ex-
tension of other constitutional rules that seek to protect private lib-
erty against arbitrary encroachment.177  The void-for-vagueness doc-
trine, for example, is specifically designed to prevent the “arbitrary 
enforcement” of federal and state law.178  Thus, in Kolender v. Law-
son,179 the Court invalidated a statute that permitted police officers to 
detain any individual who failed to provide what was, in a particular 
officer’s view, “credible and reliable” identification.180  The Court 
emphasized that, by giving each officer “virtually complete discretion” 
to detain individuals,181 the provision “furnishe[d] a convenient tool 
for harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting offi-
cials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure.”182 
Likewise, the “basic purpose” of the Fourth Amendment’s prohi-
bition on unreasonable searches and seizures “is to safeguard the pri-
vacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by govern-
mental officials.”183  Thus, in Delaware v. Prouse,184 the Court held that 
police officers may not randomly stop vehicles on the highway, but 
 
176 Metzger, supra note 158, at 1145. 
177 See supra notes 167–69. 
178 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983) (stating that the “principal element” of 
the void-for-vagueness doctrine is “‘the requirement that a legislature establish minimal 
guidelines’” to prevent “arbitrary enforcement” by law enforcement officials (quoting 
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974))); see Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 
1628 (2007). 
179 461 U.S. 352. 
180 See id. at 353–54, 361–62. 
181 Id. at 358. 
182 Id. at 360 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
183 Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 
184 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
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must have at least a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation.185  The 
Court declared that the government’s asserted safety concerns did 
not “justify subjecting every occupant of every vehicle on the road[] 
to a seizure . . . at the unbridled discretion of law enforcement offi-
cials.”186  And, in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc.,187 the Court invalidated the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act, insofar as it authorized war-
rantless inspections of employment facilities.188  Such laws “devolve[] 
almost unbridled discretion upon executive and administrative offi-
cers . . . as to when to search and whom to search”189 and impermissi-
bly leave the liberty of private citizens “to the discretion of the officer 
in the field.”190 
Similar concerns about arbitrary interference with private liberty 
have led the Court to invalidate delegations to private parties.  For 
example, in Fuentes v. Shevin,191 the Court struck down two state laws 
that allowed creditors to “unilaterally invoke state power to replevy 
goods” from debtors, without giving the debtor a pre-deprivation 
hearing.192  The Court emphasized that the hearing would help pro-
tect a debtor’s property rights “from arbitrary encroachment . . . a 
danger that is especially great when the State seizes goods simply 
upon the application of and for the benefit of a private party.”193  
And, in Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge,194 the Court 
struck down a local ordinance that gave private parties the authority 
to veto the construction of an old-age home.195  The Court found this 
“delegation of power” “repugnant” because the ordinance established 
 
185 Id. at 663 (“[W]e hold that except in those situations in which there is at least articulable 
and reasonable suspicion” of a particular traffic violation, “stopping an automobile and 
detaining the driver . . . [is] unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”). 
186 Id. at 661. 
187 436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
188 Id. at 325 (“We hold that . . . the Act is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to authorize 
inspections without warrant or its equivalent . . . .”). 
189 Id. at 323. 
190 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 550 (1967); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 
(1967); see id. at 534, 540 (applying the warrant requirement to local health inspections). 
191 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
192 Id. at 93, 96. 
193 Id. at 80–81; id. at 93 (stating that the statutes impermissibly “abdicate[d] effective state 
control over state power”). 
194 278 U.S. 116 (1928). 
195 Id. at 118, 122–23 (finding that “the attempted delegation of power cannot be sustained, 
and the restriction thereby sought . . . is arbitrary and repugnant to the due process 
clause”). 
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no “standard or rule” to guide the parties’ discretion, and thus left 
them “free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily.”196 
The Article II nondelegation doctrine rests on similar premises.  
Under this theory, Congress may not confer on private parties the 
unbridled discretion as to when and whom to sue.  The Article II 
nondelegation principle thus helps ensure that private liberty is not 
“subject to the discretion of [every would-be plaintiff] in the [na-
tion].”197 
This Article II nondelegation theory also finds support in separa-
tion of powers doctrine.  In Buckley v. Valeo,198 the Court invalidated 
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, in part because it dele-
gated too much discretionary enforcement authority outside the Ex-
ecutive Branch.  The statute in Buckley authorized the Federal Elec-
tion Commission to bring enforcement actions against “any acts or 
practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of this Act.”199  
The statute, in other words, permitted the FEC to see that federal 
election law was obeyed.  As we have seen, the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly upheld such conferrals of standing on the Executive Branch.  
But the FEC was not, as originally constituted, under the control of 
the Executive Branch.  Four of the six voting members of the Com-
mission were appointed by Congress; only two were selected by the 
President.200  The Court held that, absent additional executive over-
sight, the FEC could not exercise its “wide ranging”201 “discretionary 
power to seek judicial relief.”202 
 
196 Id. at 122. 
197 Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967). 
198 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
199 Id. at 111 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(5) (1970)). 
200 See id. at 113 (describing the appointment process for the Commission). 
201 Id. at 111. 
202 Id. at 113, 137–41.  The Court found that the Commission members were principal “Offi-
cers of the United States,” who must be appointed by the President (with the advice and 
consent of the Senate) under the Appointments Clause.  See id. at 132; see also U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  My reliance on Buckley may seem to echo themes commonly associated 
with unitary executive theory.  Indeed, as Harold Krent has suggested, much of unitary 
executive theory can be understood in Article II nondelegation terms.  See, e.g., Krent, su-
pra note 159, at 90 (“Congress’ many decisions to create private attorneys general repre-
sent substantial delegations of administrative authority.”).  But unitary executive theory 
may not serve as the most useful analytical tool in this context.  Unitarians assert that any 
person who exercises a discretionary executive function must be subject to the control 
and supervision of the President.  See Steven G. Calebresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Struc-
tural Constitution:  Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1165 (1992) 
(“Unitary executive theorists . . . conclude that the President alone possesses all of the ex-
ecutive power and that he therefore can direct, control, and supervise inferior officers or 
agencies who seek to exercise discretionary executive power.” (footnote omitted)).  This 
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But what are the boundaries of this Article II nondelegation doc-
trine?  Surely no one (not even those most committed to unitary ex-
ecutive theory)203 would seriously argue that private parties can never 
exercise any prosecutorial discretion.  Such a rule would prohibit all 
private enforcement of the law.  Every private plaintiff, even one who 
has suffered a concrete injury-in-fact, has some discretionary en-
forcement authority.  The injured party has, at a minimum, the dis-
cretion to decide whether or not to bring suit.  A private organization 
may exercise even more prosecutorial discretion:  it can choose to 
bring suit against any person that has injured one of its members, as 
long as the suit is germane to the organization’s purposes. 
I do not claim that the Article II nondelegation doctrine prohibits 
all such exercises of private prosecutorial discretion.  Instead, it pro-
hibits the delegation of the Executive Branch’s duty to see that fed-
eral law or an area of federal law is obeyed.  That was the line drawn 
by Buckley, which invalidated a delegation of “discretionary power” to 
see that federal election law was obeyed.  And that prohibition goes a 
long way toward preventing arbitrary exercises of private prosecuto-
rial discretion, while at the same time allowing for private enforce-
ment of the law.  As the commentary on executive enforcement dis-
cretion suggests, it is that degree of “discretionary power” that seems 
most susceptible to abuse.  It may be true, as Justice Jackson sug-
gested, that “such a power to prosecute [must] be lodged some-
where.”204  But the Article II nondelegation doctrine instructs that 
such a power to prosecute, and the accompanying prosecutorial dis-
cretion, may not be lodged everywhere. 
2.  Standing Enforces the Article II Nondelegation Doctrine 
Once we identify the Article II principle at stake, the enforcement 
of that principle is fairly straightforward.  Standing doctrine helps en-
sure that private parties do not exercise the “discretionary power” 
 
theory could be interpreted to mean that Article II prohibits any delegation of discretion-
ary enforcement power, and accordingly that any private enforcement action is invalid.  
(Every private enforcement action, after all, involves some discretion.  The plaintiff has, 
at a minimum, the discretion to decide whether to bring suit.)  That is clearly not the law, 
and I doubt many Unitarians would advocate such a position.  But unitary executive the-
ory does not seem to offer any principled means of distinguishing between enforcement 
actions that require presidential supervision and those that do not. 
203 See supra note 202. 
204 Jackson, supra note 59, at 3. 
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that inevitably accompanies the authority to see that federal law or an 
area of federal law is obeyed. 
First, standing doctrine prohibits private plaintiffs from asserting 
abstract grievances that would give them a virtually unlimited amount 
of prosecutorial discretion.  Such grievances include the “injury to 
the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed” as well as other abstract 
concerns, such as a “special interest” in a particular area of law or a 
“conscientious objection” to particular conduct.  As we have seen, if a 
private plaintiff had standing to see that the law was obeyed, she 
could bring suit against any person, anywhere in the country, for any 
violation.  In a similar vein, if she sought to enforce a particular area 
of law that aroused her “special interests” or “conscientious objec-
tions,” she could sue any person, anywhere in the country, for any vi-
olation of that area of law.  Standing doctrine prevents private parties 
from exercising such discretionary power to seek judicial relief. 
Moreover, Article III standing doctrine allows a court to identify 
private enforcement actions that do not implicate the Executive 
Branch’s nondelegable Article II responsibilities.  A plaintiff who can 
demonstrate an Article III injury-in-fact does not have wide-ranging 
discretionary power to bring suit.  She may sue only the person that 
caused her injury, and may seek redress only for that harm.  The 
Court may therefore allow such actions to go forward, without Article 
II nondelegation concerns.205 
 
205 This Article II nondelegation theory of standing may help explain the decisions recogniz-
ing standing in suits under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).  FOIA permits any 
person to request any type of information from a federal agency (including records about 
a specific private individual or entity), without demonstrating any distinct interest in or 
particular need for the material.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989); Burka v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 142 F.3d 
1286, 1290–91 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that a FOIA request can be made by “‘any per-
son’” and that the requesting person is “not required” to demonstrate “any particular 
need for the information”); McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1237–38 (3d Cir. 
1993) (“A person seeking information under the FOIA . . . need not have a personal stake 
in the information sought.”).  If the agency declines to provide the requested material 
(perhaps because it concludes that the material is exempt from disclosure, see 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(b) (setting forth the statutory exemptions)), the individual may file suit, alleging 
an “informational injury.”  See Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449 (stating that refusing to permit 
an individual to review requested records “constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to pro-
vide standing to sue”); Burka, 142 F.3d at 1290–91 (finding standing to bring suit where a 
FOIA request was denied). 
   Scholars have suggested that FOIA is hard to reconcile with the Court’s Article III 
standing jurisprudence.  See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:  Standing 
as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1189 (1993) (arguing 
that the Court’s reasoning in Lujan “could easily support a holding that FOIA’s ‘any per-
son’ standard is unconstitutional”); Sunstein, supra note 7, at 633 (urging that certain 
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This Article II nondelegation theory suggests normative founda-
tions for Article III standing doctrine that have been largely over-
looked by commentators.  Many scholars and jurists have assumed 
that standing doctrine serves principally to prevent private interfer-
ence with executive enforcement efforts.206  But the Article II non-
delegation rationale for standing is built on far different premises.  
Under this theory, standing doctrine does not safeguard the Execu-
tive Branch, but instead helps to shield individual liberty from arbi-
trary exercises of private prosecutorial discretion. 
3.  The Scope of the Constitutional Protection 
The Article II nondelegation doctrine not only offers a different 
normative foundation for standing doctrine, but also suggests a new 
scope for the constitutional protection.  Standing doctrine applies (as 
a constitutional mandate) only in cases that implicate the liberty in-
terests of particular private individuals. 
This constitutional theory thus clearly encompasses all suits 
against private parties, when a plaintiff might target the defendant 
for nefarious reasons, such as ideological or racial animosity.  But 
suits against the Executive Branch can also implicate the liberty in-
terests of particular private parties.  For example, in Federal Election 
Commission v. Akins, the plaintiffs urged the government to enforce 
certain reporting requirements against the American Israel Public Af-
fairs Committee, because of the plaintiffs’ ideological opposition to 
that private group.207  And, in Sierra Club v. Morton and Valley Forge, the 
plaintiffs sought to prevent the Executive Branch from conferring a 
 
standing decisions appear to be on a “collision course with a number of statutes, includ-
ing FOIA”); Winter, supra note 23, at 1496 (noting similarly that FOIA appears to be in 
tension with aspects of the Court’s standing jurisprudence).  But FOIA does not consti-
tute an impermissible delegation of prosecutorial discretion.  The statute does not give 
“any person” the right to sue any person for any statutory violation.  Instead, the statute 
allows “any person” to seek a concrete benefit—information—from a federal agency.  If 
the agency provides the benefit (by producing the requested material), the requester suf-
fers no harm and cannot bring suit.  An individual suffers an injury and can file suit—and 
thereby become a prosecutor—only if the agency declines to produce all or part of the 
requested information.  But, at that point, her prosecutorial discretion is limited.  She 
may sue only the agency that declined to produce the requested material, and may seek 
only the information that the agency declined to disclose.  Accordingly, FOIA does not 
delegate to “any person” the degree of prosecutorial discretion exercised by the Execu-
tive Branch.  FOIA provides breadth of discretion with respect to the underlying right to 
seek information, but not with respect to the right to sue per se. 
206 See supra notes 6, 15–22, and accompanying text. 
207 See 524 U.S. 11, 15–16, 21–25 (1998).  For further discussion of Akins, see infra note 209. 
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benefit on a specific private entity (in Morton, the corporation seeking 
development permits, and in Valley Forge, the religious institution).208 
The Article II nondelegation principle applies in all cases that im-
plicate the liberty interests of particular private individuals and enti-
ties.  The theory thus encompasses all suits against private parties and 
all suits against the government in which a private person is the real 
party-in-interest.  Accordingly, under the Article II nondelegation 
doctrine, a plaintiff must demonstrate a concrete injury when (1) she 
demands (as in Akins) that the Executive Branch impose a burden on 
a specific private third party;209 or (2) she attempts (as in Morton and 
Valley Forge) to prevent the Executive Branch from conferring a bene-
fit on another private party.210 
But this Article II theory does not require a showing of injury-in-
fact in other suits against the federal government.  Many such actions 
do not implicate the liberty interests of particular private individuals.  
That is true, for example, when a plaintiff challenges the constitu-
tionality of a federal statute or the validity of a federal regulation.  
Courts may have strong prudential and institutional reasons for dis-
missing such suits on standing grounds.  As we have seen, private par-
ties—in contrast to the Executive Branch—need not enforce the law 
 
208 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 454 
U.S. 464, 469, 482 (1982) (holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing, as federal taxpay-
ers, to challenge the conveyance of property to a religious organization); Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 729–30, 738–41 (1972) (concluding that the plaintiff lacked stand-
ing, based solely on its “special interest” in environmental protection, to prevent the De-
partment of Interior from issuing permits for the corporation’s proposed development 
plan). 
209 The Akins Court found that the plaintiffs had standing because they alleged a concrete 
“informational injury.”  See 524 U.S. at 12, 21 (observing that, under its cases, “a plaintiff 
suffers an ‘injury in fact’ when the plaintiff fails to obtain information which must be pub-
licly disclosed pursuant to a statute”).  The Court’s analysis resembled its approach in 
Freedom of Information Act cases.  See supra note 205. 
210 Notably, public officials also have private liberty interests.  The Article II nondelegation 
principle thus provides a constitutional foundation for the denials of standing in Schlesin-
ger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 210–11, 216–27 (1974) (alleging that 
the Incompatibility Clause prohibits members of Congress from serving in the Armed 
Forces Reserve, and urging the Reserve to discharge all legislators and to seek back pay 
from any legislator who served), and Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 636 (1937) (claiming 
that Justice Hugo Black’s appointment violated the Incompatibility Clause, and urging 
the Court to remove him).  This Article II theory may also provide an alternative rationale 
for the seemingly inconsistent holdings in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85–88 (1968) (find-
ing standing in a suit challenging, on establishment clause grounds, the statutory criteria 
by which the government disbursed funds to elementary and secondary schools), and Val-
ley Forge, 454 U.S. at 469, 482–87 (denying standing in a suit challenging, on establish-
ment clause grounds, the transfer of property to a religious institution).  In contrast to 
Valley Forge, Flast did not implicate the liberty interests of any specific private parties. 
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in a uniform or consistent manner.211  They have no obligation to 
faithfully execute every provision of law, but may instead concentrate 
only on those provisions that arouse their “special interests.”  A pri-
vate organization could thus bring multiple lawsuits against an agen-
cy, forcing it to focus on that group’s “special interests,” and distract-
ing it from other statutory responsibilities.  Courts may quite 
reasonably conclude that Congress is better equipped to decide when 
the benefits of private enforcement outweigh such costs.  Moreover, 
courts have traditionally been in the business of settling disputes 
brought by plaintiffs with a direct and concrete interest in a case.  Ac-
cordingly, courts could decide, as a prudential matter, to adjudicate 
challenges to statutes and regulations only when they are brought by 
injured parties. 
Such broad-based suits against the government do not, however, 
raise the liberty or the arbitrariness concerns at the heart of the Arti-
cle II nondelegation principle.  Accordingly, this theory does not 
prohibit Congress from conferring standing on “any person” to bring 
such suits against the Executive Branch.212  Indeed, under this consti-
tutional approach, Congress may authorize any private suit against 
the federal government, as long as the plaintiff does not ask the gov-
ernment to impose burdens on, or deny benefits to, specific private 
parties. 
But this conclusion raises some questions about the Court’s re-
fusal to recognize the congressional conferral of standing in Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife.  The plaintiffs in Lujan brought suit against the 
Department of Interior, claiming that one of its regulations was in-
consistent with the Endangered Species Act.213  Such a broad attack 
on federal law does not seem to implicate the constitutional analysis 
here. 
The citizen-suit provision in Lujan was not, however, confined to 
such challenges to federal government action.  Instead, the provision 
 
211 See supra notes 141–49 and accompanying text. 
212 Thus, under this theory, Congress could have conferred standing in United States v. Rich-
ardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77, 179–80 (1974) (denying standing in a suit alleging that the 
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 violated the Constitution’s Statement and Ac-
count Clause), and Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 127 (1922) (denying standing in a 
suit challenging the validity of the Nineteenth Amendment).  And the Court probably 
should have found standing in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 815–16, 829–30 (1997) (hold-
ing that members of Congress lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the 
Line-Item Veto Act, even though the statute expressly authorized the suit).  In each case, 
however, the Court may have had other reasons to dismiss the suit as nonjusticiable. 
213 504 U.S. at 557–59.  
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authorized “any person” to bring suit against “any person”—public or 
private—alleging any violation of the Endangered Species Act or its 
implementing regulations.214  The provision thus delegated to private 
parties the Executive Branch’s duty to see that an area of federal law 
is obeyed.  The Article II nondelegation doctrine prohibits such del-
egations—not because of the way a particular plaintiff exercises such 
discretion in a particular case, but because granting such authority to 
every private party in the country raises a serious potential for arbi-
trary exercises of private prosecutorial discretion.  It is thus the very 
breadth of the grant, and not its application, that is the nub of the 
constitutional infirmity.  Accordingly, this Article II theory would 
support a decision striking down the citizen-suit provision on its face 
as an unconstitutional delegation of prosecutorial discretion.215 
The Article II nondelegation doctrine leaves Congress with some 
leeway to authorize private suits against the federal government.  
Congress may permit “any person” to bring enforcement actions that 
 
214 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988) (stating that “any person may commence a civil suit on his 
own behalf . . . to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other govern-
mental instrumentality or agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of” any provision of 
the Endangered Species Act or its implementing regulations).  Other citizen-suit provi-
sions are similar.  See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (2000) (providing that 
“any person” may sue “any person (including . . . the United States . . . ) who is alleged to 
have violated . . . an emission standard or limitation”); Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (2000) (stat-
ing that “any person” may sue “any person (including the United States . . .)” alleging a 
violation of “any standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order” issued pursuant 
to the statute).  
215 The Court in Lujan never stated whether it held the citizen-suit provision unconstitu-
tional on its face or as applied.  Several commentators have assumed that the Court in-
validated the provision as applied.  See Nichol, supra note 6, at 317 (“[T]he Court [in 
Lujan] held that the Endangered Species Act’s broad citizen standing provision, as ap-
plied, violated the Constitution.”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 
N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1751–52 (1999) (same); Sunstein, supra note 5, at 200 (same).  It is un-
clear why they make this assumption.  They may be suggesting that the Court sought to 
sever the unconstitutional applications of the citizen-suit provision.  But, on that theory, 
to ensure that the provision complied with the constitutional analysis here, the Court ef-
fectively would have had to rewrite it—to exclude not only all suits against private parties 
but also all suits demanding that the Executive Branch impose burdens on, or deny bene-
fits to, specific private parties.  There are reasons to doubt that Congress would have en-
acted such a narrow “citizen-suit” provision.  See supra note 214 (noting that other citizen-
suit provisions are as broad as the provision in Lujan).  Accordingly, severance may not 
have been a viable option.  See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884–85 & nn.49–50 (1997) 
(noting that the severability doctrine does not allow the Court to rewrite a statute to let it 
stand); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686–87 (1987) (observing that sever-
ability analysis depends on congressional intent).  For these reasons, regardless of what 
the Court intended to do, I believe it had reason to invalidate the citizen-suit provision on 
its face as an unconstitutional delegation of prosecutorial discretion. 
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do not implicate the liberty interests of particular private parties, 
such as suits challenging the constitutionality of federal statutes or 
the validity of federal regulations.  But Congress may not confer 
standing via citizen-suit provisions that transfer to private parties the 
Executive Branch’s duty to “see that federal law is obeyed.”216 
4.  Standing as a Requirement of Articles II and III 
Some may wonder whether resort to Article III is necessary.  If 
standing protects an Article II nondelegation principle, then why not 
analyze the issue solely in terms of Article II?217  That is certainly plau-
sible.  I have myself largely characterized the constitutional issue that 
way. 
But, even if standing may be conceived in Article II nondelegation 
terms, federal courts would not necessarily be wrong to characterize it 
as a “bedrock” requirement of Article III.  Article III does, after all, 
“defin[e] the role assigned to the [federal] judiciary in a tripartite al-
 
216 See supra note 214 (listing several citizen-suit provisions).  The Article II nondelegation 
doctrine may also leave room for congressional conferrals of standing in suits that impli-
cate private liberty (i.e., suits against private parties and suits demanding that the Execu-
tive Branch impose burdens on, or deny benefits to, specific private parties).  In that con-
text, to comply with the Article II nondelegation principle, Congress might be able to 
enact statutes that curtail private prosecutorial discretion.  Thus, perhaps Congress could 
define new statutory injuries in a way that, like current standing doctrine, limits both the 
pool of potential prosecutors and constrains each potential plaintiff’s prosecutorial dis-
cretion.  See supra notes 124–28 and accompanying text (explaining how standing doc-
trine places such constraints on private prosecutorial discretion); supra note 205 (noting 
that the Freedom of Information Act does not delegate substantial prosecutorial discre-
tion).  Such an approach resonates with Justice Kennedy’s view that Congress may confer 
standing on private parties, but “must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindi-
cate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 
580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  But, for purposes of this Article, I bracket questions about 
the precise boundaries of Congress’s authority to confer standing by creating new statu-
tory injuries.  I note that, because the concept of a cognizable injury has itself changed 
over time as our society has evolved, see supra notes 120–23; infra note 237 and accompa-
nying text, it may be difficult for courts to develop ex ante a workable standard for assess-
ing the limits of Congress’s authority.  Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n., 531 U.S. 457, 
474–75 (2001) (observing that, in the Article I nondelegation context, the Court has 
“‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree 
of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law’” (quoting Mis-
tretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting))). 
217 See Hartnett, supra note 11, at 2256 (asserting that, given the differences between Execu-
tive Branch and private party standing, the question of “Who can constitutionally be em-
powered to represent . . . public interests in court?” must be “a question of the proper in-
terpretation, not of Article III or Article I, but of Article II”); supra notes 15–22 and 
accompanying text. 
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location of power”218 to ensure that “federal courts will not intrude 
into areas committed to the other branches of government.”219  Fed-
eral courts would intrude into an area committed to the Executive 
Branch, if they adjudicated private actions brought to see that the law 
was obeyed.  Accordingly, the issue may not be whether standing doc-
trine derives from Article II or Article III.  It could be said to derive 
from both provisions, interpreted in context.220 
The addition of Article II does, however, have significant implica-
tions in one context:  state court actions.221  While Article III require-
ments apply only in federal court,222 the Article II nondelegation doc-
trine would apply in both federal and state court.  Accordingly, this 
theory would require state courts to identify some way of curtailing 
private prosecutorial discretion, perhaps by applying standing doc-
trine.  Although full consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of 
this Article, I wanted to note this implication of adding Article II to 
the equation.223 
5.  Is Article III Standing Doctrine the Only Answer? 
Some may doubt that Article III standing doctrine is the only way 
to enforce the Article II nondelegation principle.  That may be true, 
but I am not aware of any approach that would work as effectively. 
Some commentary suggests that Congress could cure any delega-
tion problems by giving the Executive Branch the tools to supervise 
private enforcement actions brought to “see that federal law is ob-
 
218 Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 11 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
219 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 755 (1976) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
220 Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously:  Reflections on Free-Form Method in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1278 (1995) (urging that invoking a 
single provision “without regard to the structural relationships among various constitu-
tional provisions is an inadequate mode of constitutional interpretation”). 
221 Many thanks to Henry Monaghan for pointing out this implication of the Article II theory 
articulated here. 
222 See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (observing that “the constraints of 
Article III do not apply to state courts . . . even when they address issues of federal law”). 
223 The addition of Article II to the analysis could solve a separate problem.  The Supreme 
Court generally refuses to hear appeals from state court decisions when the underlying 
state court plaintiff lacked Article III standing.  If state courts applied standing doctrine 
to enforce the Article II nondelegation principle, the Court could review more state court 
interpretations of federal law.  See William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement 
in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 263, 265 (1990) (urging that, 
to ensure Supreme Court review of state court decisions, “[s]tate courts should be re-
quired to adhere to article III ‘case or controversy’ requirements whenever they adjudi-
cate questions of federal law”). 
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eyed.”224  The argument seems to rely on Morrison v. Olson.225  In Morri-
son, the Court upheld a statute authorizing the creation of an Inde-
pendent Counsel to “investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute cer-
tain high-ranking Government officials for violations of federal 
criminal laws.”226  The statute gave the Independent Counsel consid-
erable discretion to “initiat[e] and conduct[] prosecutions” in federal 
court.227  But the Court upheld this delegation of prosecutorial discre-
tion because the statute (in the Court’s view) gave the Executive 
Branch sufficient statutory mechanisms to “supervis[e] or con-
trol[]”228 the initiation,229 scope,230 and duration231 of an Independent 
Counsel’s activities. 
There are, however, reasons to doubt that such a statutory scheme 
would effectively curtail private prosecutorial discretion.  We should 
keep in mind that, in Morrison, the Court upheld a statute that would 
allow a single public prosecutor (whose employment would com-
 
224 See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing:  U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Future of 
Public Law Litigation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 315, 355, 361–67 (2001) (asserting that Congress 
could, consistent with Article II, designate private citizens as the “agents” of the federal 
government and allow them to bring suit to enforce federal law, as long as Congress gave 
the Executive Branch the tools to oversee the private agents); Stephen M. Johnson, Pri-
vate Plaintiffs, Public Rights:  Article II and Environmental Citizen Suits, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 383, 
397–402 (2001) (arguing that federal environmental laws authorizing citizen suits do not 
violate Article II, because they give the Executive Branch various means of overseeing 
such suits); see also Krent, supra note 159, at 95 (“Congressional delegations of executive-
type authority outside the federal government might be accommodated with article II if 
the Executive retains at least some practical control over the delegated authority.”). 
225 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
226 Id. at 660. 
227 Id. at 662 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(9) (1982)). 
228 Id. at 696. 
229 The statute required the Attorney General to request that a special court appoint an In-
dependent Counsel if he concluded that “there [were] ‘reasonable grounds’” for such an 
independent inquiry.  Id. at 661 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1)(A)).  The Court rea-
soned that the Attorney General could therefore also decline to recommend the ap-
pointment of an Independent Counsel.  See id. at 696 (“[T]he Attorney General’s deci-
sion not to request appointment if he finds ‘no reasonable grounds to believe that 
further investigation is warranted’ is committed to his unreviewable discretion.”). 
230 The Court noted that, in requesting the appointment of an independent counsel, the 
Attorney General was required to provide the special court with “sufficient information 
to . . . defin[e] [the] independent counsel’s prosecutorial jurisdiction.”  Id. at 661 (quot-
ing 28 U.S.C. § 592(d)).  This obligation, the Court concluded, gave the Attorney Gen-
eral some authority over the scope of the Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction.  See id. at 
696 (“The Act thus gives the Executive a degree of control over the power to initiate an 
investigation by the independent counsel.”). 
231 The Court emphasized that the Attorney General could remove an independent counsel 
for “good cause.”  Id. at 686. 
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mence only at the request of the Executive Branch)232 to exercise pro-
secutorial discretion.  It seems at least plausible that the Executive 
Branch could have both the means and the incentive to keep track of 
the actions of this high-profile official charged with “prosecut[ing] 
certain high-ranking Government officials for violations of federal 
criminal laws.”233 
But the same cannot be said of private enforcement actions.  That 
is in part because, in attempting to carry out this oversight function, 
the Executive Branch would be subject to the same budgetary and 
time constraints that prevent it from pursuing every violation of fed-
eral law.  The Executive Branch simply lacks the resources to super-
vise every private lawsuit brought to see that an area of federal law is 
obeyed. 
Furthermore, even if it were feasible, the Executive Branch might 
still be disinclined to use such statutory tools to control private prose-
cutorial discretion.  As Daryl Levinson has argued, the pervasive as-
sumption that each branch of government aims at all times to main-
tain and increase its stranglehold on power is largely overstated.234  In 
government today, there are many instances of governmental abdica-
tion.235  Although Professor Levinson does not apply this theory to en-
forcement actions, his thesis fits quite aptly in this context.  The Ex-
ecutive Branch may often be tempted to allow private enforcement 
actions to go forward absent executive supervision (and thereby avoid 
any political fallout from those enforcement efforts).236 
Standing doctrine does not depend on the Executive Branch’s wil-
lingness or capacity to oversee private suits.  It therefore appears to 
be a more reliable means of enforcing the Article II nondelegation 
principle than a statute akin to that in Morrison. 
Standing doctrine may also be preferable to alternative mecha-
nisms for enforcing the Article II nondelegation doctrine, because it 
 
232 See supra note 229. 
233 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660. 
234 See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
915, 917, 920 (2005) (observing that an “enduring and pervasive assumption in constitu-
tional law and theory is that much government behavior is driven by self-aggrandizing 
motives toward empire-building,” but asserting that it is today doubtful that “government 
pervasively seeks to build empire of either the imperialistic or avaricious variety”). 
235 See id. at 953–55 (discussing instances in which Congress leaves domestic and foreign pol-
icy decisionmaking up to the Executive Branch). 
236 See Simons, supra note 74, at 931 n.169 (“[J]ust as Congress delegates broad enforcement 
authority to prosecutors as a strategy to avoid political responsibility for the hard choices 
prosecutors must make about whom to prosecute, prosecutors have a similar incentive to 
resist that authority and the political responsibility it brings.”). 
  
Apr. 2009] NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE 837 
 
is not a static legal formula.  As our society and laws have changed, 
the Supreme Court has expanded the injury-in-fact concept to cover 
new injuries, including vote dilution and the inability to view a spe-
cies of wildlife.237  Under the Article II theory articulated here, the 
Court can continue to recognize novel injuries-in-fact, as long as it 
defines those injuries in a way that curtails private prosecutorial dis-
cretion.238 
In presenting this defense of standing doctrine, I do not mean to 
suggest that the outcomes of the Supreme Court’s standing decisions 
are entirely defensible.  It is often difficult to comprehend why the 
Court recognizes certain injuries and not others, or adopts a narrow 
view of causation and redressability in some cases and not others.  I 
assert here only that standing doctrine serves a useful purpose in en-
suring that private parties do not exercise a law enforcement function 
that the Constitution has assigned exclusively to the Executive 
Branch. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Private enforcement actions clearly perform a valuable law en-
forcement function.  The Supreme Court can facilitate this private 
enforcement role by recognizing new injuries-in-fact, and thereby ex-
panding the realm of potential private prosecutors.  But there ap-
pears to be a policy and a constitutional rationale for preventing pri-
vate parties from asserting abstract grievances, such as the “injury to 
the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed.”239  If a private plaintiff 
had such prosecutorial authority, she could exercise the accompany-
ing prosecutorial discretion to pursue the violators of her choice, 
“unencumbered by the legal and practical checks” that constrain 
“public enforcement agencies.”240 
That may be why the Constitution imposes the duty to “take care 
that the laws [are] faithfully executed” upon the Executive Branch.241  
As Justice Jackson observed, “it seems necessary that [the] power to 
 
237 See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text. 
238 Under this formulation, the injury-in-fact requirement need not be confined to those in-
juries that were recognized at common law.  Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries, 1993 
SUP. CT. REV. 37, 55–57 (1993) (suggesting that such a limitation would harm regulatory 
beneficiaries who often do not suffer traditional common law injuries). 
239 FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998). 
240 Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 680 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of cer-
tiorari). 
241 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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prosecute” violations of federal law, and the accompanying prosecu-
torial discretion, “be lodged somewhere.”242  Such authority should be 
“lodged” solely in a governmental entity that is expected—and consti-
tutionally required—to be “the guardian of [the] public interest.”243 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
242 Jackson, supra note 59, at 3. 
243 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 27 (1960). 
